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AbstractTo inform decisions under deep uncertainty, risk analysts need to consider how best to deal with the fact that stakeholders often do not share specific concerns or fundamental perspectives. Lempert and Turner propose that deliberation can improve if models incorporate three worldviews defined in social science theory. This commentary suggests that competence and legitimacy are more likely to emerge from deliberation when models are built inductively, inquiring first about stakeholders' decision‐relevant concerns and then developing models to speak to them. The added complexity of Lempert and Turner's modeling approach presents difficult tradeoffs with accessibility and trust.

Acrimonious conflicts about technological choices regarding nuclear power, hazardous chemicals, drug testing, etc, have been viewed as problems of perception & communication. Here, it is argued that risk communication is not simply information transfer from experts to nonexperts, but rather, is a type of political discourse, in which conflicting messages are almost inevitable. It is further argued that improving the design of risk messages will not necessarily enhance nonexperts' understanding, & that the concept of an "unbiased message" is unrealistic. Two approaches to risk communication are presented: an adult education strategy that addresses scientific conflict, & creates educated, discriminating consumers; & a structural approach that allows perspectives on the truth to be obtained from conflicting messages, through countervailing incentives, independent evaluation, watchdog organizations, institutionalized debate, & distribution of resources. It is concluded that the most effective approaches are those that bring conflict out in the open, clarify its dimensions, & redress the imbalance of resources. While this strategy may result in more heated debate in the short run, it will create an educated public that can interpret conflicting information & make appropriate decisions. 44 References. S. Dilts

Described are the difficulties of reducing analysis of energy use to an application of economic theory. It is shown how economic concepts of behavior direct attention to some important determinants of consumer behavior & away from others. Analysts' accounts of short-term changes in energy use, investment in energy efficient methods, & the dynamics of investment limit understanding, resulting in some promising policy options being overlooked. Ways of employing concepts & knowledge from the noneconomic behavioral sciences are demonstrated, & two strategies for improving analysis presented. The optimal model combines a problem-oriented approach, drawing on concepts & methods from the behavioral sciences, with a model-based approach rooted in economic theory; implications of such a combined strategy are explored. In Comment: "Blind Spots" in Perspective, John M. Quigley (U of California, Berkeley) agrees that economic concepts cannot fully explain energy consumption behavior; Stern's presentation of empirical findings from the behavioral sciences demonstrates the value of noneconomic factors. However, his criticism of quantitative models of energy demand, ie, that they are based on erroneous economic theory, is refuted. It is argued that analytical "blind spots" result not from the limitations of one discipline over another, but from limitations of statistical inference. 2 Tables. Modified HA

Difficulties of building energy conservation policy on economic analyses; with commentary by John M. Quigley. Implications of using economic and other behavioral approaches in concert.