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AbstractThis article aims to incorporate the essential features of capitalism in an operational definition that identifies capitalism per se (pure laissez‐faire capitalism), and clearly excludes variations such as welfare capitalism and crony capitalism. By concisely highlighting the fundamental structures and mechanisms of capitalism, this essential definition facilitates defences of it that are more robust than those ordinarily offered. It also clarifies the relation between capitalism and phenomena with which it is frequently associated, and suggests a straightforward way of identifying and measuring the extent of capitalism in mixed economies.

AbstractOn both sides of the Atlantic, greed, the financial services industry and deregulation have been blamed for the 'Global Financial Crisis'. The genuinely unethical conduct underlying it was actually much more fundamental, pervasive and pernicious; it was positively encouraged by lax fiscal policy and promoted by government‐generated moral hazards.

This essay evaluates the nature of non‐governmental organisations and their relation to civil society, and examines appropriate criteria of legitimacy and accountability for NGOs. Unfortunately, many common understandings of NGOs embody fundamental confusions, and obscure the ways in which NGOs are inimical to individual liberty.

This article criticises the 'knowledge inheritance theory of distributive justice' presented by Gar Alperovitz and Lew Daly in their Unjust Deserts: How the Rich Are Taking Our Common Inheritance and Why We Should Take It Back; Wealth and Inequality in the Knowledge Economy (New York: The New Press, 2008). The authors claim that since innovation depends far more on accumulated knowledge than on any individual's contribution, most resulting wealth is deserved equally by all members of society. Their redistributive conclusion is not justified. Illegitimately applying the concept of justice to contexts where it is at best metaphorical, the 'knowledge inheritance theory' massively undervalues the role of individual intellectual activity, and relies on confusions concerning the nature of society, rights, causality, and gifts.

Corporate social responsibility ('CSR') is often associated with hopes for improved corporate governance. As understood conventionally, however, CSR is conceptually incoherent, practically unworkable, and wholly unjustified. To be compatible with corporate governance, 'CSR' needs to be understood not as Counterproductive Stakeholder Regimentation, but as Conscientious Stakeholder Responsibility.