Suchergebnisse

How is foreign policy in the United States really crafted? Who does the work? How are the various activities of the many key participants coordinated and controlled? In 'America's Foreign Policy Toolkit', Charles A. Stevenson identifies for students what the key foreign policy tools are, clarifies which tools are best for which tasks, describes the factors that constrain or push how they're used, and provides fresh insight into the myriad challenges facing national security decisionmakers

How is foreign policy in the United States really crafted? Who does the work? How are the various activities of the many key participants coordinated and controlled? In 'America's Foreign Policy Toolkit', Charles A. Stevenson identifies for students what the key foreign policy tools are, clarifies which tools are best for which tasks, describes the factors that constrain or push how they're used, and provides fresh insight into the myriad challenges facing national security decisionmakers.

Congress at War reviews the historical record of the U.S. Congress in authorizing, funding, overseeing, and terminating major military operations. Refuting arguments that Congress cannot and should not set limits or conditions on the use of U.S. armed forces, this book catalogs the many times when previous Congresses have enacted restrictions—often with the acceptance and compliance of wartime presidents. While Congress has formally declared war only five times in U.S. history, it has authorized the use of force fifteen other times. In recent decades, however, lawmakers have weakened their Constitutional claims by failing on several occasions to enact measures either supporting or opposing military operations ordered by the president. Concise, dramatically written, and illustrated with several summary tables, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in America's wars—past or present.

Introduction : the peculiar nature of civil-military relations in the United States -- Revolutionary war by committee -- Lincoln, Congress, and the generals -- Managing the Vietnam War -- John Adams and the politics of rearmament -- Franklin Roosevelt and the politics of rearmament -- Harry Truman and the politics of rearmament -- Theodore Roosevelt and military modernization -- The McNamara revolution -- The Goldwater-Nichols revolution from above -- The Bush-Rumsfeld war and transformation -- Conclusions : U.S. civil-military relations under stress.

With historical case studies ranging from the Revolutionary War to the war in Iraq, this new book shows how and why the US military is caught between two civilian masters – the President and Congress – in responding to the challenges of warfighting, rearmament, and transformation. Charles Stevenson skilfully shows how, although the United States has never faced the danger of a military coup, the relations between civilian leaders and the military have not always been easy. Presidents have contended with military leaders who were reluctant to carry out their orders. Generals and Admirals have appealed to Congress for sympathy and support. Congressional leaders have tried to impose their own visions and strategies on the US armed forces. This triangular struggle has recurred time and again, in wartime and in efforts to reshape the military for future wars. Illustrating this dual system of civilian military control in a series of case studies, this new volume starts from the way the Continental Congress ran the Revolutionary War by committee and concludes with the George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld efforts to transform the US military into a modern terrorist-fighting force. This detailed coverage shows how warriors and politicians interacted at key points in US history. This book will be of great interest to all students of the US Military, government of the United States and of strategic and military studies in general.

With historical case studies ranging from the Revolutionary War to the war in Iraq, this new book shows how and why the US military is caught between two civilian masters – the President and Congress – in responding to the challenges of warfighting, rearmament, and transformation. Charles Stevenson skilfully shows how, although the United States has never faced the danger of a military coup, the relations between civilian leaders and the military have not always been easy. Presidents have contended with military leaders who were reluctant to carry out their orders. Generals and Admirals have appealed to Congress for sympathy and support. Congressional leaders have tried to impose their own visions and strategies on the US armed forces. This triangular struggle has recurred time and again, in wartime and in efforts to reshape the military for future wars. Illustrating this dual system of civilian military control in a series of case studies, this new volume starts from the way the Continental Congress ran the Revolutionary War by committee and concludes with the George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld efforts to transform the US military into a modern terrorist-fighting force. This detailed coverage shows how warriors and politicians interacted at key points in US history. This book will be of great interest to all students of the US Military, government of the United States and of strategic and military studies in general.

The Clinton Administration has developed and applied a fairly detailed set of guidelines on the use of force. The Clinton criteria are derived in large measure from official military doctrine promulgated by Gen. Colin Powell, but they have been modified particularly in light of U.S. experience in Somalia. The current consensus doctrine calls for overwhelming force in defense of vital national interests in order to achieve a quick, decisive victory with low U.S. casualties. When important but not vital interests are involved, and costs and risks are commensurate with those interests, limited military means may be used for limited political objectives. In all cases, military operations should have clearly defined and achievable missions, with measurable milestones and an exit strategy to guard against mission creep. Public and congressional support is deemed advisable but not necessary. This article illustrates the application of this doctrine in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.