The Cost of Ruling, Cabinet Duration, and the "Median-Gap" Model
In: Public choice, Band 113, Heft 1, S. 157-178
ISSN: 0048-5829
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In: Public choice, Band 113, Heft 1, S. 157-178
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 113, Heft 1-2, S. 157-178
ISSN: 0048-5829
In a recent article Paldam & Skott (1995) provide a theoretical explanation for an important empirical phenomenon in democratic countries: incumbent governments tend to lose votes. In this paper, I show that Paldam & Skott's theoretical explanation for this "cost of ruling" is potentially much stronger than they recognize. Specifically, when generalized in a straightforward way, their model explains not only the cost of ruling itself, but also a second well-established empirical fact: that the longer an incumbent government has been in power, the more votes it loses. Further, this generalization of the model produces two additional empirical hypotheses that have not yet been tested in the empirical literature. 5 Figures, 9 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: American journal of political science, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 620
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 620-633
ISSN: 0092-5853
This article aims to establish empirically whether changes in the aggregate policy preferences of voters in western democracies relate systematically to national economic performance. Results from a time-series, cross-sectional regression analysis of data on aggregate policy preferences from fourteen western democracies (1956-1989) support a hypothesis originally suggested, for the American case, by Durr (1993): when the economy expands aggregate policy preferences move left, but when the economy contracts aggregate policy preferences move right. This finding sustains the normatively appealing conclusion that change in aggregate policy preference reflects the measured response of many individuals to changes in their political environment. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 620-633
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 134-148
ISSN: 1476-4989
AbstractThe crosswise model is an increasingly popular survey technique to elicit candid answers from respondents on sensitive questions. Recent studies, however, point out that in the presence of inattentive respondents, the conventional estimator of the prevalence of a sensitive attribute is biased toward 0.5. To remedy this problem, we propose a simple design-based bias correction using an anchor question that has a sensitive item with known prevalence. We demonstrate that we can easily estimate and correct for the bias arising from inattentive respondents without measuring individual-level attentiveness. We also offer several useful extensions of our estimator, including a sensitivity analysis for the conventional estimator, a strategy for weighting, a framework for multivariate regressions in which a latent sensitive trait is used as an outcome or a predictor, and tools for power analysis and parameter selection. Our method can be easily implemented through our open-source software cWise.
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 251-295
ISSN: 1939-9162
We argue that the kind of political information voters should possess varies contextually in response to relevant political processes. Focusing on the partisan organization of legislatures, we derive hypotheses for what the typical American should know about politics at the national and state level and test these hypotheses in two studies. The first documents a dramatic change in American political knowledge at the national level in response to polarization—the replacement of individually oriented information with partisan information. While voters' ability to identify the candidates running to represent them in Congress has been cut in half, their ability to rank order the parties ideologically has nearly doubled. The second study provides evidence that voters are better able to identify the majority party in their state legislature where partisan control of the legislative agenda and roll‐call voting is stronger. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings.
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 641-649
ISSN: 2049-8489
AbstractSocial scientists use the concept of interactions to study effect dependency. In the causal inference literature, interaction terms may be used in two distinct type of analysis. The first type of analysis focuses on causal interactions, where the analyst is interested in whether two treatments have differing effects when both are administered. The second type of analysis focuses on effect modification, where the analyst investigates whether the effect of a single treatment varies across levels of a baseline covariate. While both forms of interaction analysis are typically conducted using the same type of statistical model, the identification assumptions for these two types of analysis are very different. In this paper, we clarify the difference between these two types of interaction analysis. We demonstrate that this distinction is mostly ignored in the political science literature. We conclude with a review of several applications where we show that the form of the interaction is critical to proper interpretation of empirical results.
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 311-330
ISSN: 2049-8489
A growing literature in political science has pointed to the importance of heuristics in explaining citizens' political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. At the same time, the multidisciplinary research on heuristics in general has revealed that individuals seem to use heuristics sensibly—applying them (perhaps subconsciously) when they are likely to be helpful but not otherwise. We extend this multidisciplinary work to political behavior and present a general theory of contextual variation in political heuristic use applied to discover under what conditions (i.e., what political contexts) voters will use a partisanship heuristic to infer the legislative votes of their legislators in imperfectly disciplined voting contexts. More specifically, we predict that US constituents of loyal partisan senators will use the partisanship heuristic more often than constituents of less loyal senators. Our empirical analysis reveals strong support for our theory, contributing to our understanding of political heuristics in general and adding nuance to our understanding of the partisanship heuristic in particular.
In: Electoral Studies, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 517-523
In: Electoral Studies, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 305-320
In: American journal of political science, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 459-477
ISSN: 1540-5907
Recent scholarship in comparative political behavior has begun to address how voters in coalitional systems manage the complexity of those environments. We contribute to this emerging literature by asking how voters update their perceptions of the policy positions of political parties that participate in coalition cabinets. In contrast to previous work on the sources of voter perceptions of party ideology in parliamentary systems, which has asked how voters respond to changes in party manifestos (i.e., promises), we argue that in updating their perceptions, voters will give more weight to observable actions than to promises. Further, coalition participation is an easily observed party action that voters use as a heuristic to infer the direction of policy change in the absence of detailed information about parties' legislative records. Specifically, we propose that all voters should perceive parties in coalition cabinets as more ideologically similar, but that this tendency will be muted for more politically interested voters (who have greater access to countervailing messages from parties). Using an individual-level data set constructed from 54 electoral surveys in 18 European countries, we find robust support for these propositions. Adapted from the source document.
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 517-523
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 305-320
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 459-477
ISSN: 0092-5853