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"Andrew Stewart (1791-1872) advocated protectionist policies for nearly two decades in the House of Representatives, gaining national renown as Chairman of the House Committees on the Tariff and Internal Improvements in the 1820s. Many of Stewart's congressional speeches on economic doctrine were reproduced in full by newspapers, and he himself collected into one volume, reproduced here, all his speeches relating to tariffs. They demonstrate his belief in protectionism, in the necessity in his eyes of protective tariffs so as to enable American capitalists catch up with their British counterparts."--Provided by publisher.

Front Cover -- Contents -- Foreword -- Section A: 'Getting set' -- Chapter 1: General introduction -- Chapter 2: Introduction to on call -- Chapter 3: Preparing for on-call work -- Section B: Acutely unwell patients -- Chapter 4: Being alerted to unwell patients -- Chapter 5: Remembering the alphabet ... the 'A, B, C, D, E' assessment -- Chapter 6: The patient with chest pain -- Chapter 7: The patient with shortness of breath -- Chapter 8: The patient with an upper GI bleed -- Chapter 9: The acutely collapsed patient -- Chapter 10: The fitting patient

Challenges of coalition management: the "mpire air training scheme" negotiations -- The other "Battle for Britain": muddling along on the home front -- First victory: forgotten success in East Africa -- The struggle of command: operation crusader and the failure of British leadership -- Tumultuous months: Britain, the dominions and the politics of the widening war -- At war with "the old empire": the often difficult alliance with the United States -- Military defeat, political crisis: the loss of the Tobruk Garrison -- The worst case: the second "battle" for Kenya -- Blood and treasure: Britain and the Second World War

The term "social world" is increasingly familiar in philosophy and political theory. Rawls uses it quite often, especially in his later works. But there has been little explicit discussion of the term and the idea of social worlds. My aim in this paper is to show that political philosophers, Rawlsian or not, should think seriously about social worlds and the roles these things play and ought to play in their work. The idea of social worlds can help political philosophers think about what they do in new and fruitful ways and enrich debates about the roles, aims, and methodology of political philosophy. I begin by analyzing Rawls's uses of "social world." I then propose a broadly Rawlsian conception of social worlds as logically possible closed networks of social relations between agents. Next, I put this conception to work, arguing that the idea of navigating the landscape of social worlds can help us better understand the four apparently disparate roles of political philosophy that Rawls presents. Moving beyond Rawls interpretation, I use the idea of social worlds to develop an analogy and distinction between world-oriented and principle-oriented approaches to political philosophy. While principle-oriented approaches grant centrality and importance to engagement with principles of justice, legitimacy, or other political concepts, world-oriented approaches grant centrality and importance to engagement with social worlds. I propose two examples of world-oriented approaches, political philosophy as navigation and political philosophy as world-building, and argue that they are viable and worthy of further consideration.

The growth of non-ideal theory and of political realism has had a profound influence on methodological inquiry in political philosophy. It is now the norm for authors defending ideal theory to take special care to show that it can relate to the real world in the right sort of way. Two recent books—David Estlund's Utopophobia: On the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy ( 2020 ), and Ben Laurence's Agents of Change: Political Philosophy in Practice ( 2021 )—fit this mold. Both authors argue that ideal theory can be practical, and Estlund additionally argues that it can be valuable even if it lacks practical value. In this commentary, I argue that something important is missing from these defenses of ideal theory: they both fail to be realistic in a "second-order" way. I suggest that other recent work comes closer to meeting this standard.