Suchergebnisse

Foreword -- Introduction -- Capitalist-imperialist-crusader -- Waking up dead -- Mordor -- The prince of the marshes -- The British camp -- Regeneration -- Title TK -- Affairs -- Persia -- Ice cream -- Title TK -- Pagoda -- The supervisory committee -- High command -- Death of hero -- Friday prayers -- And would not stay for an answer -- Resolutions -- Blood money -- Resignation -- Summit -- Iraqi pastoral -- Al-Mutanabi street -- Rural rides -- Deputy -- The paths that lead to destruction -- Import substitution industrialization -- Jobs -- Mutiny -- Sheikhs -- Precautions -- The Islamic call -- Sadrines -- Majority and minority -- Our successors -- Departures -- Trust -- A new chief -- Death by the office wall -- Credibility -- Nasiriyah -- Arrivals -- Morning meeting -- A second governor -- Sage of the assembly -- Mudhif -- Ali Zeidi -- Police -- Echoes from the frontiers -- Kidnapped -- Rewarding friends -- Foreign elements -- Return to the Green Zone -- The rule of law -- Besieged -- The quick reaction force -- Kabul -- Reprise -- Final days -- Ali Zeidi -- Last days in Amara -- Handing over -- Afterword -- Acknowledgments -- Dramatis personae -- Timeline

The troop surge that cost US$2 trillion and thousands of lives has only made things worse, says former UK Secretary of State for International Development Rory Stewart

'These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world,' said Charlie Wilson, of America's role backing the anti-Soviet mujahideen. 'And then we fucked up the endgame.' With no support for Afghanistan after that war, the vacuum was filled by the Taliban and bin Laden. The Ledger assesses the West's similarly failed approach to Afghanistan after 9/11–in military, diplomatic, political and developmental terms. Dr David Kilcullen and Dr Greg Mills are uniquely placed to reflect backwards and forwards on the Afghan conflict: they worked with the international mission both as advisers and within the Arg, and they have considerable experience of counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations elsewhere in the world. Here these two experts show that there is plenty of blame to go around when explaining the failure to bring peace to Afghanistan after 9/11. The signs of collapse were conveniently ignored, in favour of political narratives of progress and success. Yet for Afghans, the war and its geopolitical effects are not over because NATO is gone–Afghanistan remains globally connected through digital communications and networks. This vital book explains why and where failings in Afghanistan happened, warning against exceptionalist approaches to future peacebuilding missions around the globe.