Suchergebnisse

In this paper we conduct a counterfactual analysis and estimate the quantitative importance of demand and supply effects on wage inequality in Germany using a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) type. Specifically, the methodological contribution of our dynamic CGE model refers to the three-level constant elasticity of substitution production function and the endogenous labor supply of three different skill types, which enable us to isolate the impact of capital-skill complementarity (i.e., demand effects) and varying skill-specific labor supply (i.e., supply effects) on the evolution of the skill premia as defined by the 9th to 1st, the 9th to 5th, and the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings. In short, our simulation results show that the complementarity effect has a particularly strong positive impact on the skill premium of the high-skilled, while the quantity effect counteracts the complementarity effect and exerts an alleviating pressure on the skill premium of the high-skilled. In quantitative terms, the complementarity effect raises the skill premium of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by more than 1.0 and 0.8 percent per year, respectively. By contrast, the quantity effect reduces both above-mentioned skill premia by almost 0.3 and 0.45 percent per year, respectively. Even though the complementarity and the quantity effects work in opposite directions, the complementarity effect has a much stronger impact on the skill premia of the high-skilled compared with the quantity effect.

Michael Stimmelmayr undertakes the intricate task of analyzing the outcome and especially the efficiency gains of capital income tax reforms. The simultaneous alteration of several tax rates will induce multiple economy wide repercussions, as firms and households change their optimal behaviour due to taxation. Therefore, a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is the only instrument which allows for a consistent quantification of all short and long run effects arising from capital income tax reforms. The author guides the reader through the setting-up of a dynamic CGE model - which was cited by German Council of Economic Advisors as the ""most advanced version"" in the group of dynamic CGE models - and discusses the simulation outcome of different German tax reforms and tax reform proposals such as the 2000 German Tax Reform, a flat tax of 25% (Kirchhof's Einfachsteuer) as well as a consumption based tax system.

This study highlights the relevance of firm losses for tax revenues when countries switch from a system of separate accounting (SA) to a system of tax base consolidation with formula apportionment (FA). The results show that in the short run, neglecting behavioural responses of firms and governments, the cross-border loss offset inherent in formula apportionment clearly decreases tax revenues. In the medium run, with firms adjusting their strategies, tax revenues are still lower under formula apportionment assuming realistic values for firms' probability of incurring losses or the costs of profit shifting. However, in the long run, where both firms and governments adjust their behaviour, the picture changes. A switch from separate accounting to formula apportionment becomes beneficial in terms of tax revenues. In addition, the results show that a higher weight on input shares in the apportionment formula may mitigate tax competition and thus increase tax revenues. Input factors – contrary to output factors – provide a backstop against a shortfall of tax revenues if subsidiaries are loss making.

This paper analyzes the relevance of firm losses for tax revenues and welfare when switching from separate accounting to a system of tax base consolidation with formula apportionment. We find that a system change unambiguously decreases tax revenues in the short run, in which neither firms nor governments can adjust their behavior, due to the cross-border loss offset inherent to formula apportionment. In the medium run, in which only firms can adjust their strategies, tax revenues are still lower under formula apportionment if the probability of incurring losses or the costs of profit shifting are sufficiently small. However, in the long run, where both firms and governments are able to adjust their behavior after the system change, a switch from separate accounting to formula apportionment is beneficial under the aforementioned conditions. Furthermore, we show that a higher weight of input shares in the apportionment formula may mitigate tax competition because, contrary to output factors, input factors provide an insurance against tax revenue shortfalls due to loss-making affiliates.

There is ample evidence that internal capital markets incur efficiency costs for multinational enterprises (MNEs). This paper analyzes whether tax avoidance behavior interacts with the costs of running an internal capital market and how policies of competing governments respond to it. We show that the interaction in itself may lead to profit taxes that are too high (low) from a social perspective, provided the costs are attenuated (magnified) by higher profit taxes. We also show that internal efficiency costs might render infrastructure provision inefficiently low. Further, we clarify the implications of the MNE's decision to set up an internal capital market and the effect of external finance on the behavior of competing governments.

There is ample evidence that internal capital markets incur efficiency costs for multinational enterprises (MNEs). This paper analyzes whether tax avoidance behavior interacts with the costs of running an internal capital market and how policies of competing governments respond to it. We show that the interaction in itself may lead to profit taxes that are too high (low) from a social perspective, provided the costs are attenuated (magnified) by higher profit taxes. We also show that internal efficiency costs might render infrastructure provision inefficiently low. Further, we clarify the implications of the MNE's decision to set up an internal capital market and the effect of external finance on the behavior of competing governments.