Suchergebnisse

This article deals with the issues of self-determination and multiethnic regionalisms in Dalmatia, Istria and Vojvodina - historic regions of today's Croatia and Serbia. The main aim is to explain the outcomes of regionalisms since 1990. The article analyses three important elements of regionalist mobilisation - the use of historiography, regional economic specificities and intergroup relations. Particular constellations of self-determination claims based on plurinational and multinational principles in the cases of Istria and Vojvodina respectively are the key theoretical contribution of the article. The article also finds that the lack of success of Dalmatian regionalism is largely due to the inability of regionalist parties to address multiple cleavages on the territory of Dalmatia. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
Summary: The article analyses post-authoritarian societies of Serbia and Greece in reference to nationalism and the process of democratization. It is a study of the post-dictatorial Greek and Serbian societies in the periods following the end of the Junta and Milosevic's rules. The comparison of these two cases identifies legacy and elements of continuity of the past regimes as features detrimental to the democratization process. The article discusses the inextricable link between the types of "revolutions" or regime changes, where a significant segment of power remained in the hands of the old regimes' structures, which resulted in the creation of somewhat truncated democracies. Failed military ventures and national projects as crucial factors in the development of these post-authoritarian societies are analyzed as well. The case studies of Greece and Serbia and their transitions to democracy, which the article deals with, contribute to better understanding of democratization models and their successful implementation.

In this chapter, we study under which conditions dyadic federations—a genus of multinational federalism composed of two major communities—have 'succeeded' (i.e., survived) and under which they have 'failed' (i.e., broken apart). Through a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of all democratic dyadic federations, past and present, we show that dyadic federations can succeed if geographical factors such as the territorial dispersion of the dominant groups play in its favour and when institutional arrangements (i.e., a proportional electoral system or a national party system) ensure fair political representation for both communities or prevent polities from being conceived in exclusively sub-national terms. In the absence of territorial dispersion, other institutional arrangements such as executive inclusiveness and an equal economic distribution between groups appear to be crucial in preventing the breakup. In general, dyadic federations that survive tend to do so for many years. By contrast, our analysis shows that a bipolar federal project is likely to fail in the absence of stabilising institutional arrangements (i.e., electoral proportionality and a national party system) and, more particularly, when economic resources are unequally distributed between communities and when these communities are clearly territorially separable. The duration of the union is, again, of importance because the dyadic federations that failed did so at their very beginning. Our results inform the literature on federalism, national diversity and democracy by showing that federalism can be a successful institutional arrangement for bipolar polities when its survival as a state is desired or without a viable alternative.

In this chapter, we study under which conditions dyadic federations—a genus of multinational federalism composed of two major communities—have 'succeeded' (i.e., survived) and under which they have 'failed' (i.e., broken apart). Through a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of all democratic dyadic federations, past and present, we show that dyadic federations can succeed if geographical factors such as the territorial dispersion of the dominant groups play in its favour and when institutional arrangements (i.e., a proportional electoral system or a national party system) ensure fair political representation for both communities or prevent polities from being conceived in exclusively sub-national terms. In the absence of territorial dispersion, other institutional arrangements such as executive inclusiveness and an equal economic distribution between groups appear to be crucial in preventing the breakup. In general, dyadic federations that survive tend to do so for many years. By contrast, our analysis shows that a bipolar federal project is likely to fail in the absence of stabilising institutional arrangements (i.e., electoral proportionality and a national party system) and, more particularly, when economic resources are unequally distributed between communities and when these communities are clearly territorially separable. The duration of the union is, again, of importance because the dyadic federations that failed did so at their very beginning. Our results inform the literature on federalism, national diversity and democracy by showing that federalism can be a successful institutional arrangement for bipolar polities when its survival as a state is desired or without a viable alternative.