Suchergebnisse

AbstractLike so many features of the British Empire, policy for colonial higher education was transformed during the Second World War. In 1945 the Asquith Commission established principles for its development, and in 1948 the Carr–Saunders report recommended the immediate establishment of a university in Malaya to prepare for self-government. This institution grew at a rate that surpassed expectations, but the aspirations of its founders were challenged by lack of resources, the mixed reactions of the Malayan people and the politics of decolonisation. The role of the University of Malaya in engineering a united Malayan nation was hampered by lingering colonial attitudes and ultimately frustrated by differences between Singapore and the Federation. These differences culminated in the university's partition in January 1962. In the end it was the politics of nation-building which moulded the university rather than the other way round.

An organizing principle of Britain's pre-war empire was collaboration with indigenous monarchies. Secure on their thrones, they legitimated British rule as well as assisting it in practical ways. While friendly princes were assets, however, uncooperative ones could be liabilities; they might obstruct attempts to exploit their resources or to modernize their governments. After the Second World War, British priorities and strategies changed. With their backs to the wall they switched from supporting princes to accommodating politicians. There was no obvious role for them in new nation-states and in many dependencies indigenous monarchies were swept aside by the onrush of nationalism. Yet in Malaya and Brunei they survived: the rulers of the peninsular Malay states did so by adjusting to political change, whereas the Sultan of Brunei flourished by preventing it.

After briefly overviewing British imperial strategy between 1945-51, Moslem militancy and the stability of colonial Malaya between 1945-48, the author describes the background of Maria Hertogh or Nadra riots and their aftermath. Repercussions of the crisis upon Britain's relations with Moslems inside Malaya and with key Islamic states. (DÜI-Sen)

The United Malays National Organization has been the strongest Malay political party since its foundation in May 1946; its leaders place it pre-eminent in the history of Malay nationalism and Malayan independence. Needless to say, these claims have been disputed by its opponents and queried by its students; not only have the origins of Malay nationalism been traced to the pre-war era, but also, it can be argued, in its early years the party's leaders were more concerned to safeguard Malay rights vis à vis the other races of Malaya, and were more inclined to collaborate with the British authorities in opposition to radicalism within their own community, than to struggle for self-government. Nevertheless, the formation of U.M.N.O. was a remarkable event. For the first time a mass and pan-peninsula Malay movement emerged to attack British policy. Its popular support, forceful leadership and effective organization surprised Briton and Malay alike. U.M.N.O. amounted to an unprecedented Malay response to colonial rule.