MP behavior in mixed-member electoral systems
In: Electoral Studies, Band 35, S. 78-87
24 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Electoral Studies, Band 35, S. 78-87
In: Electoral Studies, Band 35, S. 78-87
Previous research has argued that representatives in mixed-member electoral systems adjust their behavior to the mode of their election, the so-called mandate divide. MPs elected in single-member districts focus on their district, whereas those elected through closed party lists focus on their party. Yet this ignores that candidates in mixed-member systems can run in a district and on their party's list concurrently. This paper presents a model of how the prospects of re-election in the district and through the party list affect the relationship between voters, candidates, and parties. It is shown that the dual candidacy option results in candidates focusing on their party in most instances. The model is applied to a novel data set on the allocation of federal road construction projects in Germany. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]
In: Representation, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 55-67
ISSN: 1749-4001
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 35, S. 78-87
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 78-101
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: West European politics, Band 41, Heft 5, S. 1191-1207
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: European Union Politics, 13(3), 2012
SSRN
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 413-433
ISSN: 1741-2757
The European Union budget is distributed primarily in the form of intergovernmental grants to sub-state governments, which invest the grants in local projects. Transfers are allocated under the auspices of the European structural funds. This article assesses the causal links between electoral incentives on the recipient side, European funding goals, and local grant allocation. Tobit regressions of the allocation patterns in 419 local districts in Germany for the period 2000–6 suggest the following: although recipient sub-state governments enjoy substantial discretion in selecting projects, their distributive choices are largely in accord with European goals. As theoretically predicted, however, there is robust evidence that sub-state governments' electoral concerns distort the local allocation of structural funds.
The European Union budget is distributed primarily in the form of intergovernmental grants to sub-state governments, which invest the grants in local projects. Transfers are allocated under the auspices of the European structural funds. This article assesses the causal links between electoral incentives on the recipient side, European funding goals, and local grant allocation. Tobit regressions of the allocation patterns in 419 local districts in Germany for the period 2000–6 suggest the following: although recipient sub-state governments enjoy substantial discretion in selecting projects, their distributive choices are largely in accord with European goals. As theoretically predicted, however, there is robust evidence that sub-state governments' electoral concerns distort the local allocation of structural funds.
BASE
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 413-434
ISSN: 1465-1165
In: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Band 55, Heft 2, S. 275-293
SSRN
In: Rationality and society
In: Experiments in public management research
In: Forthcoming in Journal of Common Market Studies
SSRN