Suchergebnisse

The development of international arbitration as an autonomous legal order is one of the most remarkable stories of institution building at the global level over the past century. Today, transnational firms and states settle their most important commercial and investment disputes not in courts, but in arbitral centres, a tightly networked set of organizations that compete with one another for docket, resources, and influence. In this book, Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel show that international arbitration has undergone a self-sustaining process of institutional evolution that has steadily enhanced arbitral authority. This judicialization process was sustained by the explosion of trade and investment, which generated a steady stream of high stakes disputes, and the efforts of elite arbitrators and the major centres to construct arbitration as a viable substitute for litigation in domestic courts. For their part, state officials (as legislators and treaty makers), and national judges (as enforcers of arbitral awards), have not just adapted to the expansion of arbitration; they have heavily invested in it, extending the arbitral order's reach and effectiveness. Arbitration's very success has, nonetheless, raised serious questions about its legitimacy as a mode of transnational governance.

AbstractInternational trustee courts embody a specific form of delegation, in which state principals confer on such courts the authority to interpret and apply treaties agreed by the states in order to realize specific values and interests. Human rights courts help states resolve commitment and enforcement problems that are inherent in human rights treaties. This study seeks to answer the question, what happens when states parties seek to reduce or eliminate the authority of a human rights court? To answer these questions, the article assesses six human rights treaty regimes: the Council of Europe; the Organization of American States; the African Union; the Economic Community of West African States; the East African Community; and the Southern African Development Community. The article identifies four types of de‐delegation possible with respect to international human rights courts and assesses the extent to which states have sought to de‐delegate from them. With one exception (the SADC Tribunal), the regimes examined here have so far successfully withstood the challenge of de‐delegation.

AbstractInA Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice, and the ECHR, we sought to demonstrate the power of Kantian theory to explain – or at least meaningfully illuminate – (1) the defining characteristics of modern, rights-based constitutionalism; (2) the evolving law, politics and constitutional architecture of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); and (3) the emergence of a global, cosmopolitan commons, featuring inter-judicial dialogue at its core. This article responds to contributors to the special symposium on the book. In Part I, we defend our account of a Kantian-congruent, domestic system of constitutional justice. Part II reflects on the ECHR as an instantiation of a cosmopolitan legal order, and on the European Court's case law – particularly its enforcement of the proportionality principle. In Part III, we assess the evidence in support of a broader 'constitutionalization' of international human rights law.

Abstract
In their article 'Walking Back Human Rights in Europe?', Helfer and Voeten (hereinafter 'H-V') argue that a series of High Level Conferences (2012–2018), specifically Brighton (2012), dramatically altered the style of the European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) decision-making. The Grand Chamber began to adopt judgments which, in turn, provoked an unprecedented wave of 'Walking-Back Dissents'. Such dissents are separate opinions that, in effect, accuse the majority of a Grand Chamber of 'tacitly overturn[ing] prior rulings or settled doctrine in favour of national governments' (H-V, p. 823). In an expansive conclusion, H-V suggest that the ECtHR has also generated a rising number of 'Walking-Back Judgments', which lower standards of rights protection. We reject H-V's major claims on the empirical evidence. The outcomes of Brighton and subsequent conferences did not pose a credible threat to the Court, and could not have induced it to 'walk back' rights protection. We also closely examined two sets of Walking-Back Dissents identified by H-V, focusing on judgments that would be 'most likely to fit' H-V's 'expectations'. We found that fewer than one in four judgments analysed actually contained a Walking-Back Dissent. And we identified only one plausible Walking-Back Judgment. We are confident that H-V's results are inaccurate and cannot be reproduced by external analysts. We conclude by noting factors that H-V do not consider, but that are crucial to understanding the ECtHR's decision-making. In appendices, posted online, we summarize and give reasons for our coding decisions.