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The exact relationship between religiosity and moral values is understudied, and it is unclear what the process of secularization means for the morality of Europeans. Previous research shows that religion is associated with low levels of political and economic development. A potential explanation is that religion provides an alternative moral authority to the authority of the state. Using data from four waves of the European Values Study (EVS) 1981-2008, I analyze attitudes to personal autonomy (vs tradition) and self-interest (vs social norms) in a multilevel model of 48 European countries. The results show that religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s. We also show that religiosity is more negatively associated with self-interest among people with low confidence in state authorities.

AbstractThe exact relationship between religiosity and moral values is understudied, and it is unclear what the process of secularization means for the morality of Europeans. Previous research shows that religion is associated with low levels of political and economic development. A potential explanation is that religion provides an alternative moral authority to the authority of the state. Using data from four waves of the European Values Study 1981–2008, I analyze attitudes to personal autonomy (vs tradition) and self-interest (vs social norms) in a multilevel model of 48 European countries. The results show that religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s. We also show that religiosity is more negatively associated with self-interest among people with low confidence in state authorities.

Although many different models of radicalization integrate different intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intergroup processes, this interactive approach is scarcely present in the empirical studies. The goal of this study was to fill this gap by combining personality traits (Machiavellianism), ideology (Islamism), and outcomes of intergroup comparisons (perceived deprivations) as predictors of support for Daesh among Muslims in the MENA region, based on Arab Barometer IV data. Results were calculated on the overall sample and on synthetically balanced samples from Algeria and Palestine, respectively, to ensure the robustness of findings. While Islamists were generally supportive of Daesh, socio-politically deprived individuals were not. A negative relationship between Machiavellianism and support for Daesh was found only in Algeria. Multiple interactions, which differed in Algeria and Palestine, confirm the relevance of studying complex relationships among potential predictors of extremism, as well as the role of context that can strengthen or diminish these relationships.

It is common to portray conservative and liberal Protestant denominations as "strong" and "weak" on the basis of indices such as church attendance. Alternatively, they can be regarded as qualitatively different cultural systems that coexist in a multiple-niche environment. We integrate these two perspectives with a study of American teenagers based on both one-time survey information and the experience sampling method (ESM), which records individual experience on a moment-by-moment basis. Conservative Protestant youth were found to be more satisfied, family-oriented, and sociable than liberal Protestant youth, but also more dependent on their social environment, which is reflected in a deterioration of their mood when they are alone. Liberal Protestant youth appear to have internalized values that remain constant whether in the presence or absence of others. We relate these results to the social scientific literature on liberalism and conservatism and to evolutionary theory as a framework for explaining cultural systems as adaptations to multiple-niche environments. © Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009.

Die Tendenz, dass Frauen religiöser sind als Männer wurde häufig beobachtet. Zur Begründung dieses Unterschieds wurden viele Theorien formuliert, deren Erklärung von biologisch bis soziologisch reichen; ein Konsens zur Erklärung des Geschlechtsunterschieds in der Religiosität wurde nicht erreicht. Auf der Basis von Daten aus dem European Social Survey, der European Values Study und dem International Social Survey Programme sowie einer neuen Methode zur Messung des Gender Gap vergleichen wir Länder, Generationen und Zeiträume in Europa, um drei Schlüsselfragen zu beantworten: 1) Wie stark hängt der Unterschied zwischen Männern und Frauen vom verwendeten Indikator für Religiosität (z. B. Mitgliedschaft, Kirchgang, Beten, Glauben) ab? 2) Besteht auf der Ebene der Nationalstaaten eine Beziehung zwischen der Größe des Gender Gap und dem Ausmaß der Säkularisierung oder der Gleichheit der Geschlechter? 3) Nähert sich die Religiosität von Männern und Frauen in der Generationenfolge oder über die Zeit an? Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine Verringerung des Gender Gap in Europa, insbesondere in Süd- und Osteuropa hin, nach wie vor sind jedoch Differenzen beobachtbar. Selbst in sehr säkularen Ländern und solchen, in denen die Ungleichheit zwischen den Geschlechtern stark reduziert wurde, identifizieren sich Frauen deutlich häufiger als Männer mit einer Religionsgemeinschaft, sie halten sich für religiöser und praktizieren ihre Religiosität sowohl öffentlich als auch privat häufiger.