Suchergebnisse

Vestens umiddelbare reaksjon på Talibans maktovertakelse i Afghanistan i august 2021 har stort sett vært den samme som da Taliban kom til makten første gang i 1996. Vestlige stater og FN valgte den gang å isolere regimet, nekte diplomatisk anerkjennelse og etter hvert innføre strenge sanksjoner. Humanitær bistand var tillatt, men ikke samarbeid med Talibans statlige organer og ikke kanalisering av bistand via staten. Det er derfor grunn til å vurdere Vestens nåværende respons i lys av historien. Sanksjons- og isoleringspolitikken på 1990-tallet ga ikke forventede resultater og virket for det meste mot sin hensikt. Er det grunn til å tro at en lignende politikk i dag vil være mer effektiv? Hvis ikke, hva er konturene av et bredere og strategisk mer balansert engasjement?
Abstract in EnglishThe Road Ahead – Confrontation or Creative Compromises?The immediate reaction of Western states to the Taliban's seizure of power in Afghanistan in August 2021 was broadly speaking the same as when the Taliban first came to power in 1996. Western states and the UN chose at that time to isolate the regime, deny it diplomatic recognition and gradually impose strong sanctions. Humanitarian assistance was allowed, but not program cooperation with Taliban authorities and state institutions, and no assistance was to be channelled via the Taliban-controlled state. The results are highly relevant today. In the 1990s, the sanctions-and-isolation policy did not bring about the desired results, and in important respects were counter-productive. Are there reasons to believe that similar policies today will be more effective? This article outlines the contours of a broader and strategic more balanced engagement.

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 lays the foundations for a political transition in Afghanistan after 23 years of war. The agreement excludes the defeated party, the Taliban, while seeking to commit the remaining groups to a long-term and loosely defined peace process. With Afghan regionally based political-military groups defined largely along ethnic lines, and closely linked to external powers, rebuilding national authority will be a slow and conflictual process. Rebuilding the coercive capacity of the state is essential to overcome strong centrifugal tendencies, yet must be timed so as not to get ahead of the restoration of legitimate political authority. International assistance can support the political recovery by being conscious of the need to neutralise the "spoilers" of the peace process. (DSE/DÜI)