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This thesis consists of five empirical studies, all relating to shareholder activism at annual general meetings. The first study concerns the structure and content of general meetings in Denmark and Sweden comparatively. The paper reveals significant differences in the level of activism, with Swedish investors being the most active in terms of proposals, proxy voting, and 'voice'. The paper takes a legal approach, and discusses divergence in activism levels from the perspective of shareholder prerequisites to engage in monitoring efforts. Further, the paper investigating the topics addressed through questions and opinions. The results show that matters which can be categorized as irrelevant are reasonably rare. This is an important finding, as suggestions to abolish general meetings have often been based on the assumption that general meetings facilitate nothing but irrelevant, time consuming, and costly discussions that serves no monitoring function. The second study analyses the impact of voting power on shareholder activism. We hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and a measure of the largest shareholder's sensitivity to increased participation by small shareholders and find that firms' amenability to small shareholder influence leads to more proposals by the nomination committee, but fewer proposals by other shareholders. We interpret this as evidence that the shareholder elected nomination committees effectively channel shareholder concerns and preempt other kinds of activism. Politicians and companies that desire active shareholders could improve the amenability of firms to shareholder influence by ownership transparency, shareholder committees, and contacts with shareholder associations and other vehicles for collective action.

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper analyses the impact of voting power on shareholder activism using unique data on activism at Swedish shareholder meetings. We hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and a measure of the largest shareholder's sensitivity to increased participation by small shareholders.Research Findings/Insights: We find that firms' amenability to small shareholder influence leads to more proposals by the nomination committee, but fewer proposals by other shareholders and fewer proposals voted against. We interpret this as evidence that the shareholder elected nomination committees effectively channel shareholder concerns and preempt other kinds of activism. In addition, we find more shareholder activity in large firms and less activity in leveraged firms.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper offers a new voting power approach to the study of shareholder activism. We show the empirical implications of this approach, but also the importance of local institutions such as nomination committees in shaping the nature of shareholder activism.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Politicians and companies that desire active shareholders could improve the amenability of firms to shareholder influence by ownership transparency, shareholder committees, contacts with shareholder associations and other vehicles for collective action.

The Study on Directors' Duties and Sustainable Corporate Governance (hereinafter 'The Study') was published on 30 July 2020 and is accompanied by a Commission Inception Impact Assessment and a consultation deadline of 8 October 2020. The Assessment adds very little to the Study and this response is consequently made to the Study by a group of Nordic company law scholars. Resume of Findings. The Study displays a lack of understanding of the nature of legal discourse and presents a biased, unrepresentative and highly politically motivated survey of literature and empirics. The Study misrepresents fundamental concepts of company law and fails to understand how corporate governance works. The Study exaggerates the problem of climate change and neglects the many other, equally serious, problems facing both company directors and EU legislators in their obligations to their respective constituencies. The policy pursued by the Study contravenes both fundamental concepts of ownership rights inherent in European law and the basic policies that underlie the founding treaties of the European Union and its assumptions are equally incompatible with EU secondary legislation on company law and capital markets. The Study underestimates the many existing measures adopted by EU legislators and their potential to serve as alternatives to its own far-reaching measures in a way that fundamentally would void the principle of subsidiarity and deprive Member States of control with their own economies. The regulatory options recommended by the Study would seriously harm European business and prevent it from continuing to contribute to the sustainable growth and prosperity that the Union needs to fulfil its overall policies. On this basis, we find that the Study cannot serve as the basis for contemplating the proposed regulatory initiatives and that any discussion must proceed on a better informed foundation brought about by a free and unbiased discourse.