Suchergebnisse

Abstract
We outline a theory of algorithmic attention rents in digital aggregator platforms. We explore the way that as platforms grow, they become increasingly capable of extracting rents from a variety of actors in their ecosystems—users, suppliers, and advertisers—through their algorithmic control over user attention. We focus our analysis on advertising business models, in which attention harvested from users is monetized by reselling the attention to suppliers or other advertisers, though we believe the theory has relevance to other online business models as well. We argue that regulations should mandate the disclosure of the operating metrics that platforms use to allocate user attention and shape the "free" side of their marketplace, as well as details on how that attention is monetized.

Recent decades have seen a dramatic rise in an array of costly government incentives used to attract FDI. Yet while use of incentives by both national and sub-national governments around the world is ubiquitous, with few exceptions little is known about their prevalence, distribution, effectiveness and impacts. For the most part, the use of investment incentives has thus far escaped systematic monitoring, reporting, analysis and regulation. But this may be changing. Certain types of incentives—especially fiscal, financial and regulatory—have increasingly been discouraged by international organizations and experts as they are costly, potentially harmful to sustainable development, and often economically inefficient, resulting in increased inequality rather than inclusive growth. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that companies may seek—and governments may offer—incentives beyond those that may be needed to attract an investment. Other aspects of incentive packages (such as public investments in infrastructure and/or training) may be more effective but under-utilized. Given the potentially large costs and benefits of investments and investment incentives for countries, this background paper, prepared for the VCC Conference on the same topic on November 13-14, 2013, aims to advance our understanding about the role that incentives have played in attracting and retaining foreign direct investment; the policy rationales supporting or discouraging various types of incentives; the strategies that may be more effective at achieving the objectives of host governments; and the potential for future coordinated action on these issues.

Abstract
Attempts by governments to curb the market power of 'Big Tech' (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms, and Microsoft) are impeded by limited public information on their diversified digital platform ecosystems. Big Tech's annual 10-K financial reports disclose little about their globally dominant 'free' services, platform user numbers, and monetization practices, and suites of products. To support antitrust and regulatory oversight, we propose mandatory 10-K type disclosures covering Big Tech's: (i) internally used operating metrics (e.g. monthly active users), which underpin platform market share and monetization; (ii) ubiquitous 'free' products which escape traditional 'profit and loss' reporting; (iii) 'monetization' processes detailing how platforms make money from user data and attention; and (iv) product-by-product reporting through updating segment reporting rules. Disclosures should be mandatory for digital 'gatekeepers' and eventually integrated into reporting standards for all digital platforms.