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AbstractThis article demonstrates that deindustrialization increases ethnonational mobilization. We maintain that levels of mobilization of ethnonational movements are to an important extent a residual to the class cleavage, that is, to the degree the class conflict dominates political competition. Since in the context of Western Europe industrialism is the main force behind the class cleavage, deindustrialization weakens this cleavage and allows instead for mobilization along ethnonational divisions. In order to empirically test our argument, we analyze levels of electoral mobilization of ethnonational party blocs among 15 Western European minorities between 1918 and 2018. Our analysis clearly reveals that levels of industrialization are negatively related to ethnonational mobilization. However, this is only true for regions with historically high levels of industrialization and if the ethnonational movement is unified. The article contributes to the comparative literature on the electoral performance of ethnonational parties and the literature on deindustrialization and nationalism.

The dominance of the political opportunity structure approach has led to an emphasis of institutional variables in the field of migrant mobilization. This paper critically discusses political opportunity structure theory and defends alternative explanations for variance in levels of ethnic protest among migrants. In particular, it is argued that cultural distance, social stratification, and transnational bonds might be the driving forces behind the political mobilization of migrants. The theories are tested with protest event data for seven European countries between 1975 and 2005.

AbstractResearch on electoral choices of citizens with migration background has remained largely descriptive. What is missing is a systematic test of theories that can explain individuals with migration background's voting behavior. This article provides such a test on the basis of a post‐electoral survey from the 2011 Swiss general election. It is the first study on the electoral behavior of the first and second generation in Switzerland. And it shows that specific migration background impacts considerably on vote choice. In particular, individuals with migration background belonging to outgroups have a higher propensity to vote for the Left than natives. This relationship is partly explained by the party identifications adopted by the citizens with migration background belonging to outgroups.

"Der Beitrag untersucht die politische Partizipation der in der Schweiz wohnhaften Personen mit Migrationshintergrund Türkei aus vergleichender Perspektive. Er beschreibt die politische Beteiligung der Migranten in verschiedenen politischen Arenen und vergleicht sie mit anderen Migrantengruppen in der Schweiz und anderen 'Türkiyeli' in verschiedenen westeuropäischen Ländern. Dabei kommt die Untersuchung zum Schluss, dass 'Türkiyeli' in ganz Europa aktiver sind als andere Migrantengruppen und sich politisch eindeutig links positionieren. Im Gegensatz zu 'Türkiyeli' in anderen Ländern richten jene in der Schweiz ihre Forderungen mehrheitlich an ihr Herkunftsland, und ihre politische Beteiligung findet in erster Linie in der außerparlamentarischen Arena statt. Es wird argumentiert, dass der schwierige Zugang zur Schweizer Staatsbürgerschaft die Fokussierung auf das Herkunftsland und die Konzentration auf Protestaktionen weitgehend erklären." (Autorenreferat)

The use of party cues is a fundamental process of how voters adopt policy preferences. While research has shown that party identification is an important driver of political attitudes in general and policy positions in particular, we know little about how negative party identification (identifying as an opponent to a party) impacts voters' political preferences. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature by combining an experimental and observational empirical analysis of the effect of negative party identification on voters' issue preferences in the context of direct democratic decision‐making. First, we analyze a survey experiment conducted during a real‐world campaign on affordable housing for a popular ballot in Switzerland. Using continuous measures of party identification, we show a causal relationship between negative party identification and voters' policy preferences. Second, we use longitudinal observational data of vote choice on direct democratic policy proposals and show that voters adopt policy preferences that contrast with the policy positions of parties they oppose. In sum, the two complementary designs show that voters tend to position themselves not only in alignment with their preferred parties but also in opposition to parties with which they negatively identify. Furthermore, the results indicate that, when adopting policy preferences, negative cues may carry as much weight as positive party cues. Our analysis has important implications for understanding voters' adoption of policy preferences in general and specifically in the direct democratic context.

AbstractProspects for democracy in multi-ethnic societies are generally more promising if elections are not mere ethnic censuses, in which people vote predominantly for co-ethnic parties and candidates. But what institutions facilitate or hinder ethnic voting? Unlike past studies, this article explores ethnic voting by conducting a natural experiment (rather than surveys or laboratory experiments). It examines the case of Fribourg, a bilingual (French/German) Swiss canton where elections at different levels of government, within the same electoral district, are held under both majoritarian and proportional systems. Coupled with the high territorial homogeneity of the linguistic groups, this unique setting allows us to conduct a robust empirical analysis of voter behaviour. We find that cross-ethnic voting is significantly more frequent in multi-member majoritarian elections than in list-PR elections or in two-member majoritarian elections. Our results yield qualified support to the centripetalist approach to electoral design in multi-ethnic societies, that favours majoritarian systems, rather than to the consociational school that advocates proportional representation.

This chapter aims to answer two general questions: Is there conflict on certain core issues relating to globalization within societies; and does the context of globalization matter for the strength of this conflict? Results show quite strong aggregate correlations between economic and cultural globalization and support for migration, between political and cultural globalization and support for internationalized governance, and some support for a relationship between problem loads and issue orientations. At the individual level, our results show that educational differences produce strong differences in issue orientations in particular regarding migration and global warming, the higher the level of education, the stronger the support for migration and, to some extent, for border-crossing authority as well, and the higher the sensitivity to environmental problems. Results also show that the contexts of globalization shape the degree how strong differences between social and ideological groups have an impact on issue orientations. Generally, the more globalized a country is, the more polarized opinions are between social and political groups in society.