"The result of a research project carried out by the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research for the British Army, this anthology of case studies examines the expansion of an armed force during the age of total war. Each chapter examines how an army prepared for a major conflict in times of peace and how it adapted peace-time doctrine and training to an expanded army during wartime, offering invaluable insights to not only today's military professionals but anyone with interest in defense."--Back cover
Historical research on the German army of the interwar period has concentrated on the development of the so-called 'Blitzkrieg'. However, Matthias Strohn shows that for most of the time the German army, restricted by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, was too weak to launch an offensive war or even effectively repel an invader. Accordingly, the army focused instead primarily on planning a defensive war against superior enemies, especially France and Poland. Making extensive use of German archival sources, Strohn explores the development of military thought and doctrine for the defence of Germany and shows how these ideas were tested in war games and staff rides. His findings comprehensively revise our understanding of the German army in this period, shedding new light on the ideas of leading figures in the German military and how events, such as the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, influenced military planning.
Die britische Armee galt lange als die Armee, welche am besten dazu geeignet war, Operationen zur Aufstandsbekämpfung (counierinsurgency - COIN-Operationen) durchzuführen. Der Grund hierfür lag in der besonderen Geschichte des britischen Weltreiches, welches auch die Aufgaben der Streitkräfte bestimmte: Einsätze kolonialer Art waren über lange Zeiträume die Wirklichkeit der britischen Armee. Lag das Hauptaugenmerk zunächst auf der Gewinnung neuer Kolonien sowie der Durchführung von Strafexpeditionen, so wandelte sich dieses Bild in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts. Von nun an galt es, das Gewonnene zu bewahren und zu verteidigen, insbesondere gegen Aufstände und Insurgentenbewegungen. Im Zuge der Dekolonialisierung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg änderte sich die Aufgabe. Von einer Bewahrung ging man nun vermehrt dazu über, einen geregelten Übergang zur Unabhängigkeit der Kolonien zu gewährleisten. Die Bilanz dieses Ansatzes war, wenn auch von einigen Rückschlägen getrübt, im Großen und Ganzen erfolgreich. Aufgrund dieser Geschichte erstaunt es nicht, dass einige der wichtigsten Theoretiker der modernen COIN aus Großbritannien stammten. In dem Beitrag werden die drei bedeutendsten Vertreter dieser Gruppe vorgestellt und ihre Überlegungen bezüglich COIN analysiert. (ICF2)
After the First World War and the signing of the treaty of Versailles, the German army was forced to rethink its guidelines and restructure its forces. Generaloberst (Colonel-General) Hans von Seeckt had a special role in the development of the Reichswehr in the Weimar Republic. His influence was of such importance that he has been called the 'creator of the Reichswehr'. As an answer to Germany's changed geopolitical and military situation after the First World War, Seeckt developed the structure of the Neuzeitliches Heer or 'modern army', which distinguished itself fundamentally from the prevailing military doctrine in the German army. His vision of this modern army was of special importance to him and became the core of his innovative thinking, even if the restrictions of the Versailles treaty made sure it remained only a vision. This army would be characterized by a small number of soldiers, who would be well trained and equipped. This would enable the army to conduct a highly mobile war, which Seeckt saw as the key to success in future conflicts. This article examines Seeckt's model and the implications this would have had on a future war.
