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We do not know; but simplistic answers to the title's question should be mistrusted. In this paper, we first provide a literature overview, laying out the vast diversity of theories on the role of monetary aspects for economic growth both within mainstream growth theory and within heterodox perspectives. In fact, completely contradicting results have been derived from a variety of reasonable theories. Based on this literature survey, we explore the narrative background of the most prominent theories as each of them is related to and justified by a distinct narrative. For instance, mainstream growth textbooks are based on the assumption that "money is a neutral medium of exchange" while other approaches hold that "zero interest rates are a precondition for a stationary economy". We show how these narratives - though they may well contain some truth - lend themselves to serve as myths, which rather inhibit than facilitate our understanding of the complex relationship between monetary variables and economic growth. Finally, we discuss consequences for the degrowth debate in terms of practical proposals for overcoming assumed growth imperatives as well as theoretical consequences.

In this paper, I use the resilience framework to interpret the project of transforming the German energy system into a renewable energy sources (RES)-based system, the so-called Energiewende, as a regime shift. This regime shift comprises several transformations, which are currently altering the technological, political and economic system structure. To build my argument, I first sketch how technological, political and economic developments reduced the resilience of the conventional fossil-nuclear energy regime and created a new RES-regime. Second, I depict recent changes in German public discourse and energy policy as the shift to the RES-regime. Third, I highlight challenges involved with increasing the resilience of the RES-regime. In particular, sufficient resilience of the electricity transmission grid appears to be crucial for facilitating the transformation of the whole energy system.

In meiner Dissertation untersuche ich konzeptionelle und ökonomische Aspekte der Resilienz von Ökosystemen, also der Widerstandsfähigkeit von Systemen gegenüber exogenen Störungen. Hierbei stütze ich mich auf wissenschaftstheoretische Argumentation und ökologisch-ökonomische Modellierung. Ich zeige wie Resilienz als wichtige systemische Eigenschaft ökonomisch untersucht und bewertet werden kann.

In this paper, we take a political economy perspective on barriers that inhibit a transition beyond the growth-paradigm - that is, we frame transition barriers as looming distributional conflicts. Within the current paradigm, distributional conflicts are mitigated via economic growth. Hence, the solution of these distributional conflicts is a prerequisite for a successful transition. Specifically, we analyze three examples of transition barriers. First, unemployment represents the most commonly cited reason why economic growth is considered indispensable. Second, pension schemes rely on economic growth to offset demographic change. Third, alternative indicators to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have not succeeded in replacing GDP as a standard metric of economic welfare. In each of these three examples, we identify actor-interest constellations that foster the status quo. We conclude that compensating those actors who would presumably be worse off due to a transition beyond the growth paradigm may be inevitable to mitigate and overcome the distributional effects to be triggered by the transition.

Critiques of modernity often align with critiques of the existing institutions of lib-eral democracy. We argue that the degrowth movement can learn from the experience of past critiques of modernity by avoiding their major mistake - that is, (inadvertently) conflating a critique of modernity with a rejection of liberal democratic institutions. Hence, we suggest to frame degrowth as the promotion of new vocabularies within a deliberative account of democ-racy. Specifically, we proceed in three steps: first, we briefly review some essential critiques of modernity and their stance towards liberal democracy. Second, we illustrate how some of the argumentative patterns within the degrowth literature may inadvertently endanger core values of the open society. Third, we introduce our perspective on a liberal degrowth that aims to fulfil the "unfinished project of modernity".

Die fundamentale Transformation der Energieversorgung im Zuge der Energiewende berührt auch die Importabhängigkeit Deutschlands. Einerseits sind durch Reduzierung des Energieverbrauchs und Umstellung auf "heimische" Erneuerbare Synergieeffekte zu erwarten. Andererseits stellen fluktuierende Erneuerbare und der Kohleausstieg mittelfristig einen höheren Verbrauch von Gas als sauberer Backup-Technologie in Aussicht, was wiederum die Importabhängigkeit der deutschen Energieversorgung erhöhen dürfte. Allerdings besteht kein grundsätzlicher Zielkonflikt zwischen Energiewende und Versorgungssicherheit, da spezifische Risiken mit adäquaten Maßnahmen adressiert werden können, etwa einer Diversifizierung der Anbieterstruktur beim Gasimport.

Critiques of modernity often align with critiques of the existing institutions of lib-eral democracy. We argue that the degrowth movement can learn from the experience of past critiques of modernity by avoiding their major mistake - that is, (inadvertently) conflating a critique of modernity with a rejection of liberal democratic institutions. Hence, we suggest to frame degrowth as the promotion of new vocabularies within a deliberative account of democ-racy. Specifically, we proceed in three steps: first, we briefly review some essential critiques of modernity and their stance towards liberal democracy. Second, we illustrate how some of the argumentative patterns within the degrowth literature may inadvertently endanger core values of the open society. Third, we introduce our perspective on a liberal degrowth that aims to fulfil the "unfinished project of modernity".

In this paper, we take a political economy perspective on barriers that inhibit a transition beyond the growth-paradigm - that is, we frame transition barriers as looming distributional conflicts. Within the current paradigm, distributional conflicts are mitigated via economic growth. Hence, the solution of these distributional conflicts is a prerequisite for a successful transition. Specifically, we analyze three examples of transition barriers. First, unemployment represents the most commonly cited reason why economic growth is considered indispensable. Second, pension schemes rely on economic growth to offset demographic change. Third, alternative indicators to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have not succeeded in replacing GDP as a standard metric of economic welfare. In each of these three examples, we identify actor-interest constellations that foster the status quo. We conclude that compensating those actors who would presumably be worse off due to a transition beyond the growth paradigm may be inevitable to mitigate and overcome the distributional effects to be triggered by the transition.

Die deutsche Energiewende steht sowohl "von oben" als auch "von unten" unter Druck: Verfechter einer dezentralen Energiewende sehen letztere wegen jüngster Änderungen bei der Förderpolitik für Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien in Gefahr, während andererseits eine stärkere europäische Einbettung eben dieser Förderpolitik gefordert wird. Der Beitrag analysiert dieses Spannungsfeld vor dem Hintergrund der Theorie des Fiskalföderalismus. Diese fiskalföderalistische Perspektive wägt die Argumente für Dezentralisierung (etwa "Föderalismus als Labor") gegen die Argumente für Zentralisierung (etwa Effizienzgewinne durch Skaleneffekte) ab. Da sich der Zielkonflikt nicht eindeutig auflösen lässt, scheint pragmatisches Vorgehen angeraten – die primär auf Bundesebene stattfindende Koordination der Energiewende kann somit als normativ legitimiert gelten, gleichwohl auf eine Realisierung von Synergiepotentialen auf EU-Ebene nicht verzichtet und die dezentralen Aspekte der Energiewende (zum Beispiel Informationsvorteile bezüglich regionaler Externalitäten) berücksichtigt werden sollten. ; Although Germany's energy transition is widely perceived as a national project, transition policies are developed within a system of Multi-Level Governance: both European and sub-national levels contribute to shaping the transition pathway, either directly (e. g., via regional initiatives to deploy renewables) or indirectly (e. g., via EU-guidelines affecting national policies). Paradoxically, national transition policies are also criticized for both lack of European coordination and for discouraging regional transition efforts. The paper analyses the existing relations between national and supra-/subnational energy polices against the background of the theory of Fiscal Federalism, which focuses on the trade-off between decentralization and centralization. In particular, the paper weighs the benefits of centralization against the benefits of decentralized policy experimentation. Meanwhile, the exact amount of (de)centralization proves elusive. In consequence, the national level may provide the best option to pragmatically balancing the benefits of both centralization and decentralization.

This paper frames the transition towards clean energies as a sequential process of instrument choice and instrument change. First, regulators decide how to initiate the transition away from fossil energies. Here, support policies for renewable electricity are politically convenient because they face low resistance from fossil energies' interest groups. In the second stage, regulators need to adapt support policies for renewables to challenges arising along the transition pathway. We empirically substantiate our arguments by tracing the development of support policies in Germany. Against the backdrop of this analysis, we point towards small-step policies that could foster the transition process.

In this paper, we employ a public choice perspective to analyze the development of policies for renewable energy sources (RES) in the EU in general and in Germany more specifically. In doing so, we explain the main characteristics of current RES policies in the EU by reference to the selfinterest driven motivations of voters, stakeholders and political actors. One important puzzle, which we address, is the following: How could effective RES-policies be introduced against the political opposition of fossil-fuel interest groups in the past? Via analyzing the German example in more detail, we show how over time a self-reinforcing interplay of ideological and financial RES support has emerged. Moreover, we demonstrate that observed specific design choices for EU RES policies, such as largely riskless remuneration schemes, high degrees of technology differentiation and decentralized decision-making across Member States, can be traced back to politicians' need to balance a variety of partly opposing interests. A major benefit of the presented analysis is that it provides a realistic assessment of the challenges for RES policy reform - any reform effort critically depends on its ability to balance stakeholder interests.

It is often argued that Germany's energy transition (the so-called Energiewende) needs to be Europeanized, so as to make the transition process more efficient. In particular, the German system of feed-in tariffs for renewables is criticized for being an obstacle to efficient European energy supply. However, we point out that Germany's approach is no outlier but rather well embedded in the European context of heterogeneous energy policies. Also, full centralization of energy policy decisions on the EU-level is neither desirable from an economic point of view nor a politically feasible option. Against this background, we identify priorities for fostering the European dimension of the Member States' energy policies, such as the coordination of grid extensions and capacity markets.