Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe 2016 referendum on the UK's membership of the EU has led to much questioning of the place of the referendum in the UK's constitution with a particular emphasis on the status of Parliamentary and popular sovereignty. Some commentary suggests that the UK has shifted from a constitution of Parliamentary sovereignty to one of the popular sovereignty. Drawing on A.V. Dicey's discussion of the UK constitution in his Introduction to the Law of the Constitution, this article sets out the case that the referendum is the site of a change in the UK's constitution. However, according to this case, the change is not accurately described as a shift from Parliamentary to popular sovereignty. It is better understood in terms of the emergence of a new constitutional convention which has altered the manner by which Parliament, as the legal sovereign, is kept subordinate to the 'people' as the political sovereign. The article offers some preliminary empirical assessment of this case for constitutional change and indicates areas for future research. These include considering the possible influence of democratic constitutionalist thinking in the UK's use of referendums and the desirability and implications of a full transition to democratic constitutionalism.

In response to researcher concerns a number of initiatives have been developed to support individual researchers seeking ethics review and approval. In this issue, Sonne et al. (2017) outline an example of an intervention to support researchers, which they refer to as a Regulatory Knowledge Support (RKS) service. While the study points to potential benefits, other studies have not had the desired impact on key performance measures. There is a need to develop a community of practice and expand the burgeoning evidence base regarding what interventions work, for whom, and under what circumstances. Advancing the research agenda requires: the development of theoretical models for intervention design and evaluation; developing consensus on key data for collection and measures of effectiveness; conducting evaluations using the strongest possible study designs, and; publishing the findings of evaluations.

Abstract
To what extent does the case for exemptions from laws to accommodate religious (and perhaps other conscientious) commitments rest specifically on egalitarian arguments? To what extent should specifically egalitarian or anti-discrimination concerns be used to determine when such exemptions should be granted? This Article considers both of these questions. It argues that while egalitarian considerations have a role to play in both the general justification and case-by-case evaluation of exemption claims, neither the justification, nor the evaluation of exemptions, properly rests solely on specifically egalitarian considerations. At the level of justification, there is an important, independent role for something akin to the principle of respect for conscience recently put forward by Martha Nussbaum; and, when citizens come to evaluate particular claims for exemptions, the anti-discrimination approach put forward by Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager in the context of the U.S. and its constitutional tradition is more plausibly seen as a complement to the "balancing test" which has been used historically rather than as an alternative to it.