Originally published in 1975. The main concern of this book is the nature of the gap between the theoretical issues, raised at an abstract level by social scientists, and their facts, the material organized in an empirical analysis. The author draws on material from several disciplines to explore the contributions of social science theory to historical insight
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In the late 1960s representative democracy was under fire from various directions even in countries, like Britain and America, where it had appeared to be most secure and successful. Must democracy be a sham, either because of the power of pressure groups and other established decision-makers, or because the people' are too ignorant and irrational? What, in any case, does or can representative government mean in a complex industrial society - and what does it mean to be rational in politics? It is to these and other vital issues that this book, originally published in 1970, directs itself. In the course of their argument the authors, who feel no contradiction between their academic and their radical democratic' commitments, draw extensively upon recent empirical studies of voting, pressure groups, and of the sociological and social psychological aspects of political behaviour in Britain and the USA at the time. Problems of the nature of such evidence, the conduct of attitude surveys and opinion polls, and the relationship between modern research and the traditional themes of political theory are also analysed.
CLASSICAL POLITICAL THEORY HAS BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH TWO over-arching problems; the stability and survivaI of political systems and the rationality of political acts. Rational decisions, it has been assumed, lead to stable and successful government. The first rule of nature is to make peace, Hobbes pointed out, and it is human reason that devises means for doing this.All the arguments, of course, have hung on the definition of rationality, and more particularly on the question ofwho, in practice, is to define what is rational or contribute to such a definition. The ultimate objective of the philosophers has been the 'good of the whole community', so the question has always resolved itself into establishing criteria for deciding which category or categories of person, under which set of rules or restraints, are most likely to make rational contributions to political decision-making for the good of the whole society. A large vocabulary of concepts – sovereignty, general will, obligation, citizenship, rights and so on – has been developed to provide theoretically satisfactory answers to this question.