Suchergebnisse

Providing case studies of debt defaults by Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Moldova, and Uruguay, framed by a discussion of the history, economic theory, legal issues, and policy lessons of sovereign debt crises, this work examines the facts, economic theory, and policy implications of sovereign debt crises.

This paper attempts to understand the factors that explain the degree of support or criticism that a reform process may be subject to. Understanding these determinants is critical, in turn, to assess the feasibility and sustainability of those reforms. In particular, we want to assess what are the elements that create societal consensus for reform and which are the main factors that turn public opinion against it. In the case of Argentina, for example, such dynamics are critical to understand how public opinion imposed constraints on government behavior, affected macroeconomic performance, and ultimately, determined the chance of success of reforms.

The main motivation for prudential regulation is to increase the solvency of the banking sector. However, it is usually understood that tighter regulation also leads to more concentration and higher spreads. Thus, these prudential measures are seen as implying a trade-off between solvency and competition. In this paper the authors present a model concerning Argentina, in which tighter capital requirements lead banks to choose a lower degree of product differentiation, potentially inducing more intense competition and lower spreads. (DSE/DÜI)

In this paper we model delayed stabilizations as the rational outcome of a distributional conflict between two risk averse groups in the presence of post‐stabilization payoff uncertainty and costly policy reversion. We show that in the initial stages of an extreme inflation episode there is a bias towards maintaining the current inefficient (but certain) revenue collection system which prevents the adoption of the required fiscal adjustment program. The access by those with higher income to a financial adaptation technology increases the average rate of inflation through time for any given government deficit, raising the welfare costs of not reaching an agreement and increasingly redistributing the burden of inflation to those with lower income. This process, if strong enough, will eventually trigger the necessary political support for the required fiscal adjustment. Delayed stabilizations will, nevertheless, induce the poor into accepting conditions that they did not find optimal before.