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In this article, we examine the Turkish case for populism that was applied since the establishment of the multiparty regime on 1950. The originality of the Turkish case resides in two facts. (1) Populist policies were implemented by conservative center-Right governments rather than by Left governments as in some Latin American countries. Based on patron-client relations as a dominant characteristic of the rural social structure, these parties organized themselves as patronage networks. These party organizations can be characterized as machine-parties rather than as parties with coherent ideologies & national programs. Thus, they distributed to their clients the resources obtained more or less easily from foreign suppliers during the Cold War, due to Turkey's geostrategic importance as a NATO member. (2) It entails a vicious circle provoked by these populist policies manifest in a cycle of populist policies/crisis/military intervention/austerity measures. However, with the end of the Cold War period & the beginning of the globalization era, it became harder for Turkish governments to obtain long-term foreign debt in terms of multilateral agreements to carry out their populist policies. As a result, these resources were replaced by short-term, high-cost capital inflows. These inflows paradoxically facilitated the implementation of populist policies &, at the same time, worsened already severe consequences. As a result, sociopolitical tensions created by these severe conditions triggered the rise of radical movements such as political Islam & ultranationalism. Adapted from the source document.

A generalized climate of distrust in political institutions is not functional to healthy democracies. With the advent of social media, recent scholarly efforts attempt to better understand people's conspiracy theory beliefs in inhibiting institutional trust. This study contributes to this literature by considering the direct antecedent effects of uncertainty avoidance and the moderating role ofactivesocial media use—SMU (i.e., interactional SMU, informational SMU, and political expressive SMU). The former is theorized to enable conspiracy theories to thrive, while the latter should cushion the negative effects of conspiracy beliefs on institutional trust. Relying on diverse survey data across different cultures from Europe, the Americas, and New Zealand (N = 11,958) and applying structural equation modeling, findings supported the hypothesized model. In high uncertainty‐avoidance societies, where less well‐known situations are perceived as uncomfortable or downright threatening, conspiracy beliefs proliferate and negatively impact institutional trust. Active SMU attenuates these effects. Via social media, citizens have the ability to strengthen social relationships (interactional SMU), keep themselves informed about the community (informational SMU), and engage in political self‐expression (political expressive SMU), which mitigate conspiracy‐belief negative effects on institutional trust. Future research implications and key limitations of the study are all discussed.

Leading academic institutions, governments, and funders of research across the world have spent the last few decades fretting publicly about the need for scientists and research organisations to engage more widely with the public and be open about their research. While a global literature asserts that public communication has changed from a virtue to a duty for scientists in many countries and disciplines, our knowledge about what research institutions are doing and what factors drive their 'going public' is very limited. Here we present the first cross-national study of N = 2,030 research institutes within universities and large scientific organisations in Brazil, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. We find that institutes embrace communication with non-peers and do so through a variety of public events and traditional news media-less so through new media channels-and we find variation across countries and sciences, yet these are less evident than we expected. Country and disciplinary cultures contribute to the level of this communication, as do the resources that institutes make available for the effort; institutes with professionalised staff show higher activity online. Future research should examine whether a real change in the organisational culture is happening or whether this activity and resource allocation is merely a means to increase institutional visibility.