Suchergebnisse

I examine replications of empirical papers in development economics published in the top-5 and next-5 general interest journals between the years 2000 through 2015. Of the 1,138 empirical papers, 71 papers (6.2 percent) were replicated in another published paper or working paper. The majority (77.5 percent) of replications involved reanalysis of the data using different econometric specifications to assess robustness. The strongest predictor of whether a paper is replicated or not is the paper's Google Scholar citation count, followed by year of publication. Papers based on randomized control trials (RCTs) appear to be replicated at a higher rate (12.5 percent).

Political control of firms is prevalent across the world. Evidence suggests that firms profit from political connections, and politicians derive benefit from control over firms. This paper investigates an alternative mechanism through which politicians may benefit electorally from connected firms, examining sugar mills in India. I find evidence of embezzlement in politically controlled mills during election years, reflected in lower prices paid to farmers for cane. This result complements the literature on political cycles by demonstrating how campaign funds are raised rather than used. Politicians may recompense farmers upon getting elected, possibly explaining how they can get away with pilferage. (JEL D72, G34, L66, O13, O17, Q12, Q13)

Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of promised future rents (e.g. efficiency wages) but not of illicit future rents. Yet when opportunities for future rent extraction increase, agents should extract less rent today in order to preserve those opportunities. We study this "golden goose" effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official micro-records to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64%.

Optimal fiscal policy depends on the marginal benefits of public spending. In developing countries corrupt officials often embezzle funds, so optimal policy should reflect marginal corruption. We analyze marginal corruption in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme. Strikingly, workers received none of the increase even though initially they were on average overpaid. The data are inconsistent with theories of \voice" in which the threat of complaints limits corruption, but consistent with "greasing the wheels" theories in which (a) corruption undoes price interventions and (b) the market bounds how much rent officials can extract.

The severe economic crisis facing several countries in the region over the last couple of years has led many observers to predict a backlash against market policies and even against democracy in the region. An economic crisis of such proportions should also, in theory, have negative effects on subjective well being. Our analysis, based on the Latinobarómetro surveys from 2000–2002, finds some unexpected positive trends, as well as notable differences between those countries that suffered from crises and those that did not. Satisfaction with market policies and with the way democracy is working has decreased among all groups except the very wealthy. In contrast, support for democracy as a system of government has increased, suggesting that respondents are increasingly distinguishing between democracy as a system of government, and the manner in which particular governments are performing. We also find evidence of changing attitudes towards redistributive taxation among the wealthy.JEL Codes. D63 (welfare economics, equity, justice, inequality); D84 (information and uncertainty, expectations); I31 (general welfare; basic needs; quality of life); J62 (mobility, unemployment, intergenerational mobility)

Antipoverty programs in developing countries are often difficult to implement; in particular, many governments lack the capacity to deliver payments securely to targeted beneficiaries. We evaluate the impact of biometrically authenticated payments infrastructure ("Smartcards") on beneficiaries of employment (NREGS) and pen sion (SSP) programs in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, using a large-scale experiment that randomized the rollout of Smartcards over 157 subdistricts and 19 million people. We find that, while incompletely implemented, the new system delivered a faster, more predictable, and less corrupt NREGS payments process without adversely affecting program access. For each of these outcomes, treatment group distributions first-order stochastically dominated those of the control group. The investment was cost-effective, as time savings to NREGS beneficiaries alone were equal to the cost of the intervention, and there was also a significant reduction in the "leakage" of funds between the government and beneficiaries in both NREGS and SSP programs. Beneficiaries overwhelmingly preferred the new system for both programs. Overall, our results suggest that investing in secure payments infrastructure can significantly enhance "state capacity" to implement welfare programs in developing countries. (JEL H53, H55, I32, I38, J65)