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Indonesia has experimented with initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) since the wave of arrests following the first Bali bombing attack in 2002. Initial efforts involved police attempting to develop relationships of trust with terrorists in custody. Today, a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), which is tasked with coordinating stakeholders in Indonesia's struggle with domestic terrorism. But managing the divergent and sometimes competing interests of Indonesia's large state institutions has not been straightforward, and effective collaboration between relevant state agencies remains an obstacle to the success of CVE initiatives. Where government has fallen short, civil society organisations (CSOs) often fill the gaps, and a number of dedicated practitioners now have invaluable experience, local contacts, and the specific knowledge required for countering extremism in the Indonesian context. CSOs also possess greater levels of trust among the communities they engage than security-centric state agencies could possibly hope to achieve. Yet instead of exploiting these civil society resources, the BNPT has largely preferred an independent (and top-down) approach to CVE initiatives, collaborating if and when assistance is required. The Indonesian government should make better use of the unique legitimacy and expertise of civil society organisations. ; Published version

Theories of a crime-terror nexus are well established in the literature. Often conceptualised along a continuum, relationships between organisations range from contracting services and the appropriation of tactics, to complete mergers or even role changes. Recent irregular migrant movements have added to the nexus, providing financial opportunities to criminal enterprises and creating grievances and heated debate that has fuelled the anger of ideological groups. In Europe, terrorist organisations have worked with and sometimes emulated organised crime syndicates through involvement in the trafficking of drugs, people, weapons and antiquities. In Southeast Asia, conflict areas provide the backdrop for cross-border drug trafficking and kidnap-for-ransom activities, while extremist groups both commit crimes for profit and target criminals for recruitment. ; Published version

Theories of a crime-terror nexus are well established in the literature. Often conceptualised along a continuum, relationships between organisations range from contracting services and the appropriation of tactics, to complete mergers or even role changes. Recent irregular migrant movements have added to the nexus, providing financial opportunities to criminal enterprises and creating grievances and heated debate that has fuelled the anger of ideological groups. In Europe, terrorist organisations have worked with and sometimes emulated organised crime syndicates through involvement in the trafficking of drugs, people, weapons and antiquities. In Southeast Asia, conflict areas provide the backdrop for cross-border drug trafficking and kidnap-for-ransom activities, while extremist groups both commit crimes for profit and target criminals for recruitment. ; Published version

The production of nuclear power has been a source of heated debate since its inception. Although nuclear energy currently provides for 13% of the world's electricity needs ("World Statistics"), the historic accidents at Chernobyl, Ukraine and Fukushima, Japan have demonstrated the sometimes-lethal hazards associated with nuclear power. These events have increased skepticism towards nuclear plants worldwide ("Poll Shows…"). In response to the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, the Federal Council and Parliament of Switzerland laid the foundations for a new energy policy – the 2050 Energy Strategy. This document details the Swiss government's decision to gradually withdraw from the use of nuclear energy. The plan prevents the construction of new nuclear power plants and announces the decommissioning of Switzerland's five nuclear power plants. Th e Federal Council has proposed reductions in energy consumption, an increase in energy research, and diversification of the nation's energy supply in order to fill the gap left by nuclear energy ("Nuclear Energy"), but the details of how Switzerland intends to enact these goals are currently unclear.'

Indonesia has experimented with initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) since the wave of arrests following the first Bali bombing attack in 2002. Initial efforts involved police attempting to develop relationships of trust with terrorists in custody. Today, a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), which is tasked with coordinating stakeholders in Indonesia's struggle with domestic terrorism. But managing the divergent and sometimes competing interests of Indonesia's large state institutions has not been straightforward, and effective collaboration between relevant state agencies remains an obstacle to the success of CVE initiatives. Where government has fallen short, civil society organisations (CSOs) often fill the gaps, and a number of dedicated practitioners now have invaluable experience, local contacts, and the specific knowledge required for countering extremism in the Indonesian context. CSOs also possess greater levels of trust among the communities they engage than security-centric state agencies could possibly hope to achieve. Yet instead of exploiting these civil society resources, the BNPT has largely preferred an independent (and top-down) approach to CVE initiatives, collaborating if and when assistance is required. The Indonesian government should make better use of the unique legitimacy and expertise of civil society organisations.

Evaluations aiming to assess the risk posed by individuals suspected or convicted of violent extremist activity have developed rapidly since the late 2000s. Largely based on a process known as structured professional judgement, terrorist risk assessments have drawn upon decades of research on those used for non-ideological violent criminals, and inserted contemporary understandings of what may drive extremist violence. While uncertainty over precise risk factors presents ongoing challenges, the primary problem is that risk assessment instruments tend to be time consuming and complex, thus requiring a level of practitioner expertise not always readily available. Over the past several years, Indonesia has been experimenting with strategies to evaluate risk among individual extremist prisoners, but disagreements over suitability and human resource constraints have hindered progress. One way forward could be the establishment of a more simplified assessment system shared by relevant government stakeholders, from law enforcement to prison authorities to social service providers. While an abridged judgement process would hold limited capacity for prediction, a collaborative approach would add clarity and much needed inter-agency coordination to the management of convicted extremists in Indonesia.