I Trust You, Will You Trust Me? Asymmetry of Bilateral Trust and the Market for Technology
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 71, S. 5410-5428
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In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 71, S. 5410-5428
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 71, S. 2698-2714
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 71, S. 2350-2363
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 71, S. 598-613
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 70, Heft 11, S. 3944-3957
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 69, Heft 4, S. 1378-1393
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 71, S. 1007-1022
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 71, S. 966-980
In: IEEE transactions on engineering management: EM ; a publication of the IEEE Engineering Management Society, Band 70, Heft 12, S. 4222-4232
In: Corporate social responsibility and environmental management, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 1605-1616
ISSN: 1535-3966
AbstractThis study investigates the relationship between governors' partisanship and the corporate environmental performance of firms in South Korea. According to political ideology perspective, governors' partisanship closely influences the policy directions and preferences of the provincial administration. Conservative (red) governors tend to induce and encourage competition among firms by deregulating and offering policy benefits to businesses at the provincial level. In response to increased competition in provinces governed by red governors, firms commit to aggressive environmental initiatives as a strategic differentiation tool, in contrast to their behavior in provinces controlled by liberal (blue) governors. Moreover, we examine a contingent role of the provincial Congress. According to the principle of checks and balances, the positive impact of red governors on a firm's environmental performance is stronger when the provincial Congress is controlled by the liberal (blue) party, with its checks and balances on the red governors. This study extends an institutional theory by exploring institutional setting mechanisms at the provincial level.
OBJECTIVES: To examine the impact and cost-effectiveness of user fee exemption by contracting out essential health package services to Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM) facilities through service-level agreements (SLAs) to inform policy-making in Malawi. METHODS: The analysis was conducted from the government perspective. Financial and service utilisation data were collected for January 2015 through December 2016. The impact of SLAs on utilisation of maternal and child health (MCH) services was examined using propensity score matching and random-effects models. Subsequently, the improved services were converted to quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained, using the Lives Saved Tool (LiST), and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) were generated. FINDINGS: Over the 2 years, a total of $1.5 million was disbursed to CHAM facilities through SLAs, equivalent to $1.24 per capita. SLAs were associated with a 13.8%, 13.1%, 19.2% and 9.6% increase in coverage of antenatal visits, postnatal visits, delivery by skilled birth attendants and BCG vaccinations, respectively. This was translated into 434 lives saved (95% CI 355 to 512) or 11 161 QALYs gained (95% CI 9125 to 13 174). The ICER of SLAs was estimated at $134.7/QALYs gained (95% CI $114.1 to $164.7). CONCLUSIONS: The cost per QALY gained for SLAs was estimated at $134.7, representing 0.37 of Malawi's per capita gross domestic product ($363). Thus, MCH services provided with Malawi's SLAs proved cost-effective. Future refinements of SLAs could introduce pay for performance, revising the price list, streamlining the reporting system and strengthening CHAM facilities' financial and monitoring management capacity.
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