The sharing economy: the end of employment and the rise of crowd-based capitalism
In: economics/business
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In: economics/business
In: The MIT Press Ser.
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 7, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
This paper presents a model of local network effects in which agents connected in a social network each value the adoption of a product by a heterogeneous subset of other agents in their neighborhood, and have incomplete information about the structure and strength of adoption complementarities between all other agents. I show that the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of this network game are in monotone strategies, can be strictly Pareto-ranked based on a scalar neighbor-adoption probability value, and that the greatest such equilibrium is uniquely coalition-proof. Each Bayes-Nash equilibrium has a corresponding fulfilled-expectations equilibrium under which agents form local adoption expectations. Examples illustrate cases in which the social network is an instance of a Poisson random graph, when it is a complete graph, a standard model of network effects, and when it is a generalized random graph. A generating function describing the structure of networks of adopting agents is characterized as a function of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium they play, and empirical implications of this characterization are discussed.
In: MIS Quarterly (Forthcoming)
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In: NYU Stern School of Business, 2021
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In: NYU Stern School of Business
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In: Network science, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 125-153
ISSN: 2050-1250
AbstractWe use data on a real, large-scale social network of 27 million individuals interacting daily, together with the day-by-day adoption of a new mobile service product, to inform, build, and analyze data-driven simulations of the effectiveness of seeding (network targeting) strategies under different social conditions. Three main results emerge from our simulations. First, failure to consider homophily creates significant overestimation of the effectiveness of seeding strategies, casting doubt on conclusions drawn by simulation studies that do not model homophily. Second, seeding is constrained by the small fraction of potential influencers that exist in the network. We find that seeding more than 0.2% of the population is wasteful because the gain from their adoption is lower than the gain from their natural adoption (without seeding). Third, seeding is more effective in the presence of greater social influence. Stronger peer influence creates a greater than additive effect when combined with seeding. Our findings call into question some conventional wisdom about these strategies and suggest that their overall effectiveness may be overestimated.
In: NYU Stern School of Business, S. -
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In: NYU Stern School of Business, S. -
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In: Forthcoming, Cambridge Handbook on the Law of the Sharing Economy
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