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"The science of behavioral economics explains the ways people are "predictably irrational." This book helps leaders understand how people "tick", how they react to incentives (monetary or non-monetary in nature) and what that means for working together - or against each other - at work. Understanding people is crucial for success in business and organizational life. But people are weird. The science of behavioral economics can help leaders understand the ways people are "predictably irrational" and what leaders can do about it. This book explains fascinating ways employees react to incentives (monetary or non-monetary) and what that means for teamwork - or working against each other - at work. Modern behavioral economics research is better suited than any other research direction to pursue these questions and provide answers. The author, one of the most influential economists in Germany, has been researching behavioral economics for 20 years and takes you on a journey to summarize for leaders the most important findings in the discpline, both for your own personal career, but also for the people and teams you lead"--

Charness et al. (2007b) have shown that group membership has a strong effect on individual decisions in strategic games when group membership is salient through payoff commonality. In this comment, I show that their findings also apply to nonstrategic decisions, even when no outgroup exists, and I relate the effects of group membership on individual decisions to joint decision making in teams. I find in an investment experiment that individual decisions with salient group membership are largely the same as team decisions. This finding bridges the literature on team decision making and on group membership effects. (JEL D71, D82, Z13)

Field data on the strategic use of deficits to limit the budgetary scope of future governments are inconclusive about the effects of political polarization or a government's re-election probability on fiscal policy. Therefore, we designed a controlled experiment to examine the strategic use of deficits. Using a within-subjects design, we find that deficits rise with a higher degree of polarization & a lower reelection probability. However, in a between-subjects design neither polarization nor reelection probabilities have a systematic effect. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for empirical tests of the strategic use of deficits with field data. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 2 Appendixes, 24 References. Adapted from the source document.

Laruelle and Widgrén (1998) have raised the question of whether the allocation of voting power in the EU is fair. This paper extends some of their results insofar as (1) it deals with the consequences if the square root rule - which is the basis for calculating fair shares of voting power - is not fully applicable; (2) it calculates voting weights that lead to a fair allocation of voting power in the EU Council; and (3) it considers the effects of an EU enlargement on the fair allocation of voting power.

This paper studies the implications of flexible integration in the European Union. It analyzes the voting power of member states in the Council of Ministers when differently sized subgroups of the EU are set up. European Monetary Union is referred to as the most important example of flexible integration. The Banzhaf-Index is calculated to study the distribution of voting power in the decision-making process according to the stability & growth pact. The results show considerable fluctuations, especially for smaller countries, in relative voting power, the latter being defined as the relation between voting power & relative voting weight. 5 Tables, 4 Figures, 38 References. Adapted from the source document.