Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Title Page -- Colophon -- Content -- KNIFE AND FORK -- THE TOP-ECONOMISTS' STUPID QUESTIONS -- FROM ICE AGE TO WELFARE -- THE HIT PARADE OF TRUST -- THE BUMBLEBEE -- THE ROOTS OF TRUST -- CORRUPTION -- TRUST IS ELEMENTARY -- THANKS TO THE WILD VIKINGS -- TRUST OR CONTROL

The Olsonian distinction between roving and stationary bandits outlines the rationale behind the transition from anarchy to the emergence of the predatory state. This two-bandit model may, however, be expanded to include more bandit types. In the case of Viking Age England, local English kings were unable to monopolize violence and defend their realms against competing Viking raiders. As the Vikings' time horizon grew, so did the accumulated value of more formal taxation, and bandit types evolved in four steps. The first step is the Olsonian roving bandit, who executed Viking hit-and-run attacks and plunders during the second half of the tenth century. The second step is the gafol bandit; gafol is payment for leaving, paid to, among others, Swein Forkbeard. The third step is the heregeld bandit; heregeld is a tax to support an army for hire; most notably Thorkell the Tall's. The fourth step is the Olsonian stationary bandit, i.e. the strongest military leader among the Vikings, Chut the Great, settled down as the new king. Overall, the Olsonian two-bandit model can be expanded to a four-bandit staircase model, in which the new gafol and heregeld bandit types explain the three steps from anarchy and short-run raiding to long-run formal taxation in a predatory state.

Has the EU Directive Proposal on CO2 trade been influenced by lobbyism and can it be improved? After hypothesizing how the EU may be vulnerable to lobbyism and why industrial groups have a strong incentive to lobby for favourable environmental regulation, we turn to empirical evidence concerning design. Here, it is possible to measure lobbyism as the difference in proposed design between the Green Paper (before lobbyism) and the final Directive Proposal (after lobbyism). Overall we suggest that this lobbyism affected the design of the EU CO2 market in favour of small-sized and well-organised industrial interest groups at the expense of the EU tax payers. Most critically, allocation of permits and enforcement issues are to be dealt with at the member state level rather than the supranational level allowing member states to favour their domestic industries. A likely market breakdown means less economic growth in the EU because the gains from free trade of greenhouse gas permits among firms in different member states disappear. Therefore, we discuss, based on the US emission trade experience, how the current design proposal can be improved.

Examines impact of political distortion on environmental regulation, particularly carbon-dioxide (CO2) greenhouse gas emission; roles of business, environmental groups, and the electricity sector. Finds that interest groups prefer a grandfathered permit market.

AbstractAre Catholics more inclined to violate social norms than Protestants? A tentative answer is yes due to this confession's attitude towards absolution of sins. Opportunities existed for Christians around Reformation times, for example as sales of indulgences. Catholics and Protestants arguably differed historically in their understanding of whether penitence is feasible or not, resulting in different conditions under which Catholics and Protestants decide in situations of social exchange. This is illustrated by ethical game theory and exemplified by historical data. The analysis points to the tentative suggestion that religious socialisation can affect social payoffs of crime and social trust in a long‐term perspective.