A social image theory of information acquisition, opinion formation, and voting
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 74, S. 102164
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 74, S. 102164
In: Karamychev , V A & Swank , O H 2022 , ' A social image theory of information acquisition, opinion formation, and voting ' , European Journal of Political Economy . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102164
Recent empirical research on voter turnout has revealed a variety of regularities. Citizens who expect to be asked about their turnout decisions after the elections are more likely to vote. Parents whose children enter the electorate are more likely to vote when their children live home than when they left home. Citizens without social networks acquire less information about politics. We develop a model that can explain these and other empirical findings. In our model, citizens receive disutility from being perceived not to have voted. This motivates a citizen to vote. Moreover, a citizen feels worse being perceived not to have voted when he is thought to have a strong opinion as this raises expectations about his voting behavior among peers. When a citizen anticipates that he will likely vote, the latter concern motivates him to acquire information, to participate in political discussions, and to vote. However, when a citizen anticipates that he will likely abstain from voting, he shies away from politics to lower his peers' expectations.
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 14-034/VII
SSRN
Working paper
Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher probability. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information.
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 12-127/VII
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Working paper
We study two aspects of globalization. It allows a decision-maker to go beyond his own local experience and to learn from other decision-makers in addressing common problems. This improves the identification and diffusion of best practices. It also provides extra information to `markets' that evaluate decision-makers: comparisons become possible. We identify conditions under which the globalization of markets helps or hurts (i) the communication among decision-makers about their own experience and (ii) the quality of the decision that is taken next. An important mediating factor is whether decision-making is centralized or decentralized.
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Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision-making that explains the public's demand for transparency, and committee members' aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Outcomes of pre-meetings are less determined, more anarchic, than those of formal meetings, but within bounds. We characterize feasible deals that are credible and will be endorsed in the formal meeting.
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In: Public choice, Band 129, Heft 3-4, S. 435-460
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 129, Heft 3, S. 435-460
ISSN: 0048-5829
A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their private information simultaneously. We show that reputational concerns make the a priori unconventional decision more attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated or not. Also, reputational concerns induce members to manipulate information and vote strategically if their preferences differ considerably from those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule balances the quality of information exchange and the alignment of interests of the decisive voter with those of the public.
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 14-017/VII
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Working paper
At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda setting, we develop a model in which a politician has to decide whether or not to address a public issue. Addressing an issue means that the politician investigates the issue and next chooses for either a major reform or a minor reform. Not addressing an issue means that the status quo is maintained. Politicians differ in their ability to make correct decisions. They want to make good decisions and want to come across as able decision makers. An important characteristic of the model is that politicians and voters have different priors concerning the desirability of a major reform. We show that electoral concerns may lead to anti-pandering. Politicians tend to put issues on their political agenda when voters are relatively pessimistic about a major reform, and keep issues off the table when voters are optimistic about major reform.
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 119, Heft 539, S. 1225-1241
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 127-156
ISSN: 1554-0634
In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2020-055/VII
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Working paper