Rights adjudication and constitutional pluralism in Germany and Europe
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 92-108
ISSN: 1350-1763
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In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 92-108
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 13, Heft 5, S. 627-646
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 13, Heft 5, S. 627-646
ISSN: 1466-4429
Over the past four decades, the transnational business community has successfully built a private system of transnational governance: the new Lex Mercatoria. The actors who operate this system -- firms, their lawyers, international arbitrators, & legal academics -- have evolved, & use, 'a-national' principles of contract & a system of private 'courts' to organize & regulate cross-border commercial exchange. National legal systems have adapted to the Lex Mercatoria, thereby enhancing the latter's autonomy, & the EU has begun to move in the same direction. References. Adapted from the source document.
In: The State of the European Union, 6, S. 18-47
In: West European politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 77-100
ISSN: 0140-2382
The article assesses the creation and subsequent evolution of systems of constitutional justice in West Europe, in light of delegation theory. The author argues that constitutional judges are better conceptualised as trustees, exercising fiduciary responsibilities, than as agents, who operate in the shadow of principals. The zone of discretion that organises the activities of constitutional courts is unusually large, in some contexts close to unlimited. The author then surveys why, and to what extent, constitutional adjudication has transformed the nature of parliamentary governance, focusing on the cases of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Notwithstanding important variation, certain trends are both pan-European and irreversible: traditional separation of powers doctrines are steadily eroding; legislators and administrators are being placed under the authority of an expansive, continuously evolving constitutional law; and the judiciary's participation in law making processes is becoming more overt and assertive. (West European Politics / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: West European politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 77-100
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 147-184
ISSN: 1552-3829
I present a theory of the emergence and evolution of governance, conceived as the process through which the rules systems in place in any social setting are adapted to the needs of those who live under them. The theory is composed of three elements: normative structure, dyadic contracting, and triadic dispute resolution. I demonstrate that a move to triadic dispute resolution leads the triadic dispute resolver to construct, and then to manage over time, specific causal relationships between exchange, conflict, and rules. In this way, political life is judicialized. Under certain conditions, the triad will constitute a crucial mechanism of political change. I then explain judicialization and the dynamics of change in two very different polities: the international trade regime and the French Fifth Republic. The conclusion draws out some of the implications of the theory and data for our understanding of the complex relationship between strategic behavior and social structure.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 147-184
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 327-338
ISSN: 1460-3667
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 327-338
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Global constitutionalism: human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 377-411
ISSN: 2045-3825
Abstract:The article develops a Kantian account of constitutional justice: the explication of those structural features of a legal system whose purpose is to optimise a polity's capacity to achieve a Rightful condition. The People, in enacting a rights-based constitution, have placed their freedom in trust. Rights ground a system of reciprocal freedom among individuals, while conferring on officials the authority to make and enforce law, subject to constraints laid down by the Universal Principle of Right [UPR]. A constitutional court, the trustee of the regime, supervises the rights-regarding acts of all other officials, assesses the reasons officials give when they take decisions that burden rights, and invalidates those acts when reasons given to justify such burdens fail to meet the demands of the UPR. Although some rights will be expressed in absolute terms, most will be qualified by a limitation clause. In adjudicating qualified rights, the court can do no better than to adopt the proportionality principle. The UPR, operationalised through proportionality analysis, lays down a basic criterion for the legitimacy of all law. Because Public, International, and Cosmopolitan Right share certain micro-foundations in common, we can extend the analysis to transnational systems of rights protection.
In: The Evolution of International Arbitration, S. 218-252
In: The Evolution of International Arbitration, S. 80-118
In: The Evolution of International Arbitration, S. 171-217
In: The Evolution of International Arbitration, S. 35-79