The European Union enjoys the competence to make laws in a wealth of areas, from environmental protection to agricultural policy. This competence is the result of many years of building and promoting European-level co-operation and integration. European Law Essentials explores the legal development of the EU. It introduces the background history of the union, then moves on to look at membership, institutions, community law, supremacy, direct effect, state liability, preliminary rulings and judicial review, and finishes by looking to the future of law in the EU. End-of-chapter summaries flag up
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AbstractThis article will question the legality of measures of environmental 'conditionality' in the Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] of the European Community [EC].1 The GSP is a GATT/WTO2 authorized scheme which permits developed nations to grant non-reciprocal tariff preferences in favour of developing countries.3 The objectives of the GSP are primarily development-oriented in that it aims to increase the export earnings of developing countries, promote their industrialization and accelerate rates of economic growth.4 A recent case taken in the WTO examined the legal contours of the grant of tariff preferences and it is in the light of this that this article will examine the so-called 'special incentive arrangements' of the reformed EC GSP which offers additional tariff preferences to developing countries on the 'condition' that they adhere to specified standards of environmental protection.
Governments intervene in the energy sector using a variety of measures to pursue a range of objectives, from security of supply and energy efficiency to environmental protection. Recent concerns about the impact of fossil fuels on climate change have resulted in the increasing promotion of biofuels as an alternative to oil. While worries exist with regard to the environmental impact of biofuel production in ecologically sensitive areas, it has been argued that with an effective regulatory framework to promote sustainable production, biofuels could provide a mechanism to provide energy security in an environmentally positive way.1The interest of the European Union (EU) in the promotion of biofuels production is a relatively recent phenomenon and it is now the world's largest producer of biodiesel and the fourth largest producer of bioethanol. At its most basic level, the promotion of biofuels as an alternative to fossil fuels is part of a wider EU effort to support the use of renewable energy. The promotion of renewable energy is traceable to a number of goals, a central one of which is ensuring security of energy supply.2Other policy goals supported by the promotion of renewable energies include reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with climate change, decreasing dependence upon imported oil, the promotion of technological development as well as regional and rural development and employment.3
In the past few years, the Chinese government opted to restrict the export of selected minerals on environmental and health grounds, subsequently leading to an uproar in countries and regions that rely heavily on imports from China to develop their renewable industry sector. This paper places the focus on the law and policy of the Chinese export restrictions of critical minerals, and its implications for the global renewables energy industry. The paper critically assesses how such export restrictions have been dealt with under the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Drawing on this WTO jurisprudence, we posit that litigation on export restrictions of the kind imposed by China poses a threat to the legitimacy of the WTO. We therefore conclude by exploring whether there are any alternatives to litigation as a means to deal with countries choosing to impose mineral export restrictions.
AbstractDuring the COVID-19 pandemic the international community repeatedly called for the equitable distribution of vaccines and other medical countermeasures. However, there was a substantial gap between this rhetoric and State action. High-income countries secured significantly more doses than they required, leaving many low-income countries unable to vaccinate their populations. Current negotiations for the new Pandemic Treaty under the World Health Organization (WHO) attempt to narrow the gap between rhetoric and behaviour by building the concept of equity into the Treaty's substantive content. However, equity is difficult to define, much less to operationalize. Presently, WHO Member States appear to have chosen 'access and benefit-sharing' (ABS) as the predominant mechanism for operationalizing equity in the Treaty. This article examines ABS as a mechanism, its use in public health, and argues that ABS is fundamentally flawed, unable to achieve equity. It proposes other options for an equitable international response to future pandemic threats.