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The article shows how serious are the differences between the EU's member states in relation to theRussian-Ukrainian conflict. It is shown that the current EU common position condemning Russian actionsin Ukraine and the sanctions against Russian based on shaky compromise countervailing interests of aUnited Europe. Events in Ukraine demonstrated the extent of the difficulties in harmonizing economicand political measures of the EU. They also reiterated the urgent need for strong coordination strategicframework Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, which would allow it to respond quickly anddecisively in a crisis. However, the author argues that although some EU's member states has taken anambivalent position on the conflict and does not want to share the burden of economic sanctions againstRussia, it is unlikely that in the near future their position can be a real obstacle to the implementation ofjoint EU action.Key words: EU's member states; Russian-Ukrainian conflict; common position; sanctions. ; Проаналізовано серйозні розбіжності між державами-членами Європейського Союзу у ставленні до російсько-українського конфлікту. Зазначено, що нинішня спільна позиція ЄС щодо несприйняття російських дій в Україні і запровадження санкцій проти Росії базується на основі хисткого компромісу різноспрямованих інтересів країн об'єднаної Європи. Події в Україні продемонстрували масштаби труднощів у гармонізації економічних та політичних заходів на рівні Європейського Союзу. Вони також підтвердили нагальну потребу узгодження міцних стратегічних рамок зовнішньої політики та безпеки ЄС, які б дали змогу йому швидше та рішучіше реагувати в кризових ситуаціях. Доведено, що хоча частина країн ЄС зайняла неоднозначну позицію щодо конфлікту і не бажає розділяти тягар економічних санкцій проти Росії, малоймовірно, що в найближчому часі їхня позиція може стати реальною перешкодою для впровадження спільних дій ЄС.Ключові слова: країни-члени ЄС; російсько-український конфлікт; спільна позиція; санкції.

The paper examines the discussion of the origins of Russia's present-day aggression and militarism, between those accusing NATO of unjustified intrusion into the Russian "sphere of influence", and those deeming that Putin's bellicose Anti-Western sentiment is a product of his need to consolidate and legitimize his power within Russia. The authors prove that domestic factors were significantly more important. The development of Ukraine's partnership with NATO and the prospects of the Alliance's further enlargement were only a false excuse for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. V. Putin's genuine fear is not NATO but the rise of successful democratic western-oriented countries along Russia's borders, especially Ukraine. It is unjustified to blame the Alliance while Putin wants to destroy Ukraine as an independent state and is ready to indiscriminately kill Ukrainian civilians. However, NATO took the disadvantageous approach of pursuing a policy of pretending that Ukraine and Georgia were on their way to Alliance membership, while, in reality, the question of their integration has been kept in limbo since the 2008 Bucharest summit. Russia probably interpreted it as a window of opportunity to change the situation to its own benefit while these countries had no "insurance policy" from NATO.

The paper analyzes the initiative of the Eastern Partnership of the EU through the prism of constructivist concepts of the "normative power" and "transformative power". The content, mechanisms and results of the implementation of the Eastern Partnership in terms of the effectiveness of the "transformative power" of the EU are analyzed. Institutional and geopolitical constraints and challenges that complicate the implementation of the EU normative influence in the Eastern Partnership countries are studied. It is reasoned that the EU's influence in partner countries is based on a complex combination of its economic attractiveness, interdependence, the promotion of international norms and the assurance of closer integration, attractive to some of its eastern neighbors (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Nevertheless, Eastern Partnership founders did not take into account the limitations of the EU's "transformative power" without the prospect of membership, significant internal obstacles to reforms in partner countries, and geopolitical situation in the region, including Russian influence. The EU's incompetence to offer strong incentives to deliver real democratic reforms in partner countries, as well as the lack of effective geopolitical levers to counter Russia's presence in the region, have significantly destabilized the EU's approach. The tendency to geopoliticize the Eastern Partnership, which can be traced back to the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is inevitable. However, it is premature to claim that it reduces the level of transformative ambitions of the EU in the region, which would lead to irreparable damage not only to its Eastern policy, but also to its overall subjectivity in the international arena. For Ukraine (as well as probably for Georgia and Moldova) to become part of a united Europe, the EU must not lose its normative influence and economic gravity, though it must also proceed from the realization of its existence as a geopolitical power capable of active diplomacy and effective use of the levers of political influence. ; У статті досліджується ініціатива Східного партнерства ЄС через призму конструктивістських концепцій «нормативної сили» та «трансформаційної сили». Проаналізовано зміст, механізми і результати реалізації Східного партнерства з точки зору ефективності «трансформаційної сили» ЄС. Розглянуто інституційні та геополітичні обмеження і виклики, які ускладнюють реалізацію нормативного впливу ЄС у державах Східного партнерства. Стверджується, що вплив ЄС у державах-партнерах ґрунтується на складному поєднанні його економічної привабливості, взаємозалежності, просуванні міжнародних норм та обіцянки більш тісної інтеграції, привабливої для деяких східних сусідів (Грузії, Молдови, України). Але творці Східного партнерства не врахували обмежень «трансформаційної сили» ЄС без перспективи членства, суттєвих внутрішніх перешкод на шляху реформ у країнах-партнерах, а також геополітичної ситуації в регіоні, зокрема сили російського впливу. Нездатність ЄС запропонувати сильні стимули для забезпечення реальних демократичних реформ у державах-партнерах, а також відсутність дієвих геополітичних важелів для противаги російській присутності в регіоні виявили слабкість підходу ЄС. Тенденція до геополітизації Східного партнерства, яка простежується з часу початку російсько-українського конфлікту – неминуча. Однак передчасно твердити, що вона призводить до зниження рівня трансформаційних амбіцій ЄС у регіоні, що нанесло б непоправної шкоди не лише його східній політиці, а й в цілому його суб'єктності на міжнародній арені. Аби Україна (можливо, також Грузія та Молдова) стала частиною об'єднаної Європи, ЄС, безумовно, не має позбуватися свого нормативного впливу та сили економічного тяжіння, однак він має виходити також із усвідомлення свого існування як геополітичної сили, здатної до активної дипломатії та задіяння важелів політичного впливу.

[full article, abstract in English]
The process of state financing of the political parties in Poland and Ukraine has been analyzed in this article. The authors have studied and compared the theoretical foundations of the Polish and Ukrainian legislation in the sphere of state financing of the functioning of the political parties. By comparing the experience of state financing of political parties in Poland and Ukraine, the authors have distinguished a number of direct and indirect positive consequences in the party system of Poland. It has been determined that in Ukraine, in turn, considering the lack of legal and public sources for financing political parties, political and economic spheres are closely interdependent, which significantly impedes the qualitative consolidation of the party system in general. The authors have concluded that the positive effect of state financing of political parties is primarily reflected in an increase in the level of openness in how the political parties function, the transparency of the parties' financial activities, the independence of the party system and the political transparency of civil society.

[full article, abstract in English] The process of state financing of the political parties in Poland and Ukraine has been analyzed in this article. The authors have studied and compared the theoretical foundations of the Polish and Ukrainian legislation in the sphere of state financing of the functioning of the political parties. By comparing the experience of state financing of political parties in Poland and Ukraine, the authors have distinguished a number of direct and indirect positive consequences in the party system of Poland. It has been determined that in Ukraine, in turn, considering the lack of legal and public sources for financing political parties, political and economic spheres are closely interdependent, which significantly impedes the qualitative consolidation of the party system in general. The authors have concluded that the positive effect of state financing of political parties is primarily reflected in an increase in the level of openness in how the political parties function, the transparency of the parties' financial activities, the independence of the party system and the political transparency of civil society. ; [straipsnis, santrauka anglų kalba]

This article analyses the effectiveness and prospects of the Eastern Partnership in the context of its ten-year implementation and the results of the Brussels Summit of 2017. The paper focuses on the current stage of the progress of the EaP partner states and the internal challenges of their development. A significant part of the article is devoted to Russia's influence on the Europeanisation process of the Eastern European countries and the weak incentives from the EU towards these countries. The Normative Power concept was used to analyse the EU-Eastern European countries bi- and multilateral relations within the Eastern Partnership co-operation, taking into consideration that the EU norms and regulations' implementation in Eastern Europe do not guarantee political normalisation in these countries. We conclude that after ten years of functioning, the Eastern Partnership has little capacity to influence political elite, domestic and regional processes in Eastern Europe, because depoliticised functional approach and the EU long-term incentives are not enough for the partners.

The article analyses the positions of the Visegrad Group and the Baltic countries on the Russia-Ukraine conflict that erupted in 2014. The authors prove that Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are united by perception that the Russian aggression in Ukraine is a threat to their national security, they support for tough policy of anti-Russian sanctions in the international arena, and assist Ukraine and the level of declarations and at the level of action. Nonetheless , level of their participation and support for Ukraine depends on their actual capabilities and domestic and foreign policy priorities. Reactions of other V4 countries to events in Ukraine are more restrained and vary from quiet pragmatism in Slovakia to clear pro-Russian voices in the Czech Republic and Hungary. It is unlikely, however, that their position can be a real obstacle to the implementation of the common EU action in the near future.

The article analyses the positions of the Visegrad Group and the Baltic countries on the Russia-Ukraine conflict that erupted in 2014. The authors prove that Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are united by perception that the Russian aggression in Ukraine is a threat to their national security, they support for tough policy of anti-Russian sanctions in the international arena, and assist Ukraine and the level of declarations and at the level of action. Nonetheless , level of their participation and support for Ukraine depends on their actual capabilities and domestic and foreign policy priorities. Reactions of other V4 countries to events in Ukraine are more restrained and vary from quiet pragmatism in Slovakia to clear pro-Russian voices in the Czech Republic and Hungary. It is unlikely, however, that their position can be a real obstacle to the implementation of the common EU action in the near future.

Abstract
This article attempts to contribute to the debate on the reasons for the inability of the US and its allies to prevent Russia from destroying the Euro ‑Atlantic security architecture by a full ‑scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as to the discussion of scenarios to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic community in the frame of preparation for the new post-war political landscape and reality. Based on a critical analysis of existing research, it is argued that despite the diversity of views of scholars and the still unpredictable outcome of the war in Ukraine, today it is possible to formulate some theses on the main directions of the European order transformation. These include enhancing the unity of the collective West, awakening Europe in the security and defense dimensions, strengthening and expanding NATO, increasing the US presence in the European region and 'the end of the history' of Russia's return to the League of Superpowers. At the same time, the following issues remain controversial: the relations between Russian aggression and the US ‑NATO strategy after the Cold War, the prospects of the United States maintaining the leading role in ensuring European security given the war ‑induced increase in Europe's defence capabilities, and Ukraine's future European and Euro ‑Atlantic integration.

Abstract
The article examines the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as the initiative of the European Union (EU) through the prism of the constructivist concepts of soft power, normative power and transformative power. The research focuses on the assessment of the EU's transformative strength in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, based on the analysis of declared EU policy goals and instruments and the real results of political reforms in partner countries. The results of the study show that the EaP has little transformative impact and needs further revision. The analysis of empirical indicators in the field of political transformation of the EaP countries shows that since its inception, as well as after the signing of Association Agreements with three countries and the renewal of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2015, no radical changes have been made, and the EU's influence on the course of reforms has been insignificant. Institutional and geopolitical constraints and challenges that complicate the EU's ability to influence its eastern neighbours are addressed. The article analyses prospects for strengthening the effectiveness of the EaP in the context of its latest update after 2020.

The paper examines the approaches of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament and the Western Balkans on the EU enlargement policy, studies the level of their influence on decision-making in the European Parliament and the candidate states, and analyzes public opinion and attitudes towards the EU enlargement in the member states and the Western Balkan states. It is argued that party-based Euroscepticism does not have a significant impact on the enlargement policy due to the lack of attention to this area of EU activity of most Eurosceptic parties in the member states and the indecisive influence of such parties on political processes in the candidate states. At the same time, public Euroscepticism on the issue of further enlargement, which tends to increase in both the member states and most of the candidate states in the Western Balkans, can be a restrictive or a limiting factor in the accession of the Western Balkan states to the EU.

Abstract
Since 2008, a negative image of China has prevailed in Europe, leading to the country's image crisis in the region. The state has implemented several policies to improve such a perception. This paper aims to examine the major tools of China's attempts at influence in Europe, targeting the media and public opinion. Applying the concept of soft power and public diplomacy, we analyse the tools China uses to modify and shape public opinion about itself in Europe. The research framework comprises secondary resources on China's foreign policy, soft power, public diplomacy and media strategy in Europe. We distinguish four primary influence tools: China buys European media outlets to prevent negative information about itself; it pays for inserts in leading European newspapers; it signs cooperation agreements with media organisations and holds media forums; and it limits access to its market to affect media, film and academic content.

The article analyses Nord Stream 2 project in terms of the national interests of Poland and Ukraine. The authors carry out comparative analysis of risks and threats which are posed by the project to the national interests of both countries in economic, political and geopolitical spheres. The probable consequences of implementation of the Russian gas initiative are discussed. Scenarios of tactical and strategic steps of Poland and Ukraine are described. These steps would allow the countries to influence the process of Nord Stream 2 project implementation and, potentially, block it; as well as allow preparing their own energy systems to new conditions which might be formed after the launch of two lines of a new Russian gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea.