Suchergebnisse

This article examines how non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) balance their moral and organisational/financial incentives in the case of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). The EUTF was created in 2015 to support the European Union's (EU's) migration policy by addressing the 'root causes' of migration in Africa. The article analyses how NGDOs have reacted to the EUTF using qualitative textual analysis of publications and press releases, and finds that NGDOs have been highly critical of the EUTF's underlying narrative, goals and implementation. Their positions align closely with the stated moral vision of supporting and empowering the global poor. Despite this critical position, many NGDOs have benefitted financially from the EUTF as project implementers. Regression analysis on the determinants of NGDO participation in EUTF projects reveals that NGDOs have largely avoided the more controversial migration management projects of the EUTF, and have focused mostly on projects that build resilience in local communities and support improving the lives and the rights of the poor in Africa. The case of the EUTF shows that NGDOs mostly practise what they preach, and while they did not abstain from the EUTF, they did not allow their financial incentives to fully dictate their actions either.

Over the past few years addressing state fragility in the third world has become an important priority in international development cooperation. However, it seems that the international donor community has so far not been able to develop adequate instruments for dealing with the problems posed by state failure. We see two reasons for this: (i) there is growing recognition within the donor community that the lack of absorptive capacity, or bad economic policies in the partner country can actually make aid counterproductive, even harmful; and (ii) it is very difficult to manage effective development cooperation with weak governments. Channelling aid through NGOs, or giving limited aid in the form of capacity-building is clearly not sufficient to solve the problems fragile states face. In order to minimize distortions caused by aid, the literature advocates a policy-based selective approach, i.e., limiting aid funds to recipients with 'good policies'. However, failed states (and many weak states for that matter) do not have the capability to formulate good economic policies, and some countries face serious challenges in meeting the criteria of good policies posed by the World Bank/IDA or the US in its Millennium Challenge Account. An important reason for this is that reforms within recipient countries aimed at forming good policies (especially liberalizing international trade, curbing inflation and cutting the budget deficit) create winners and losers, and the losers in fragile states can be strong enough to block policy changes or even cause conflict. We conclude that in order to better help weak states, the criteria for good policies must also include criteria for forming policies that compensate losers. Donors must help recipients in formulating such policies. To further ensure that losers of policy reforms do not block change, donors must pay greater attention to conflict prevention and social mediation in weak states, and to conflict management and peacebuilding in the case of failed states.

Religion is increasingly acknowledged as a driving force behind development processes; however, it has received little attention as a motivation for donors to give aid. The article analyses the stated motivations and hidden agendas behind the Hungarian government's 'Hungary Helps' aid programme, aimed at supporting Christian communities in the Global South and reducing migration to Europe. The programme fits with the government's rhetoric on religion and migration, however, the article reveals inconsistencies that suggest further motivations. While there is little evidence that there was domestic demand for such a programme, it has been used instrumentally to increase Hungary's influence among Christian interest groups and their political allies in the USA.