Suchergebnisse

This paper aims to analyze the challenges of population growth and resource scarcity in the Arab countries of the Levant. As the region has suffered from ongoing conflicts, civil wars, and political crises, the challenges of population growth and resource scarcity, coupled with environmental challenges has often been overlooked. This paper focuses on the problems associated with a growing population, such as an increased likelihood of unemployment and the emergence of a middle class poor in the region. Coupled with crony capitalism and patronage networks, it argues that the problems of youth are immediate and the necessity of inclusive policies is pressing. The paper follows by with a section that addresses environmental challenges and climate change. The linkage between environmental degradation and security is analyzed. The paper problematizes the Arab state, its regime survival strategies and its resistance to change as the main impediments for sustainability, growth and inclusiveness in the Levant.

This paper analyses the role of sub-state sectarian actors in foreign policy making in weakly established states by re-visiting the July War of 2006 in Lebanon. It mainly asks how sub-state sectarian actors behave as foreign policy actors in countries where society is divided along sectarian identities and how sectarian identities matter in terms of the definition of the self and the other and the ally and the enemy in weak states. By doing so, the paper analyses the emergence and the consolidation of foreign policy orientations, preferences and behaviour of the Maronite, Sunni, Shi'a and Druze communities in Lebanon, with a specific emphasis on the role of Hezbollah during the war. Building its main findings on various fieldworks in Lebanon, interviewing leaders of major sects; this study concludes that in the absence of a cohesive foreign policy stance in a weak state, the role of sectarian identity in defining self and other becomes central for understanding the foreign policy choices of sectarian actors.

This paper analyses the role of sub-state sectarian actors in foreign policy making in weakly established states by re-visiting the July War of 2006 in Lebanon. It mainly asks how sub-state sectarian actors behave as foreign policy actors in countries where society is divided along sectarian identities and how sectarian identities matter in terms of the definition of the self and the other and the ally and the enemy in weak states. By doing so, the paper analyses the emergence and the consolidation of foreign policy orientations, preferences and behaviour of the Maronite, Sunni, Shi'a and Druze communities in Lebanon, with a specific emphasis on the role of Hezbollah during the war. Building its main findings on various fieldworks in Lebanon, interviewing leaders of major sects; this study concludes that in the absence of a cohesive foreign policy stance in a weak state, the role of sectarian identity in defining self and other becomes central for understanding the foreign policy choices of sectarian actors.

The aim of this article is to analyze the concept of small states in the discipline of International Relations to show differences and contradictions in the definition and to discuss the literature on foreign policy and alliance behavior of small states. The article emphasizes that there has not been a single approach to the definition of small states and there is diversity in the studies dealing with foreign policy and alliance behavior of these states. While the article enables us to question to what extent this diversity makes the category of small states meaningful, on the other hand, it tries to show that this situation reflects the developments and theoretical discussions in the discipline. Differences in defining small states and diversity of foreign policy and alliance behavior lead scholars, who benefit from contending theories of International Relations, to deal with the category of small states from different perspectives.

Five years on from the Tunisian revolution, Tunisia stands as the sole success story of the Arab Spring. The country since then has managed to adopt a pluralist and democratic constitution, and held three free and fair elections. Accordingly, in the eyes of several observers, Tunisia is now in the process of consolidating its new democracy. However, the reality on the ground seems much gloomier, as most recent opinion surveys suggest that there is a significant degree of dissatisfaction, not only with political parties and Parliament but also with the very institution of democracy. Nevertheless, what accounts for this change? After the collapse of the long-lasting and oppressive Ben Ali regime, how, just in five years, has Tunisians' confidence in the democratic process changed? This article accounts for this state of affairs from a party politics view, arguing that political parties, which are the main protagonists of the consolidation process, fail to fulfill their role of acquiring legitimacy for the new regime. While party-state relations seem to be stabilized due to the inclusiveness of the constitution-making process, both inter-party relationships and the relationship between parties and society suffer from numerous flaws which, in turn, hamper the democratic consolidation process.

This article explores the discursive reasons behind the paradoxes in Turkey's foreign policy since the onset of the Syria crisis. By looking at representation of Turkey's Syria policy in two prominent pro-government newspapers, Star and Yeni Safak, the authors highlight the significance of the February 2012 episode, after which Ankara experienced deep discursive dilemmas for three reasons: the uncertain portrayal of the dyadic context, the ambiguous framing of third-party roles, and ambivalent agenda building. Despite the shadow of imminent civil war, Turkey's foreign policy elite refrained from framing the real risks arising within Syria. Idealistic-normative calls appealed to massacre rhetoric in order to legitimize humanitarian intervention. However, the geopolitical framing of third-party roles did not assist in the building of diplomatic ground for international intervention. Quite the contrary, it led to the shaping of public opinion toward realistic-utilitarian interference. Swinging between intervention and interference, Ankara pushed itself toward a liminal position. Even though the Turkish government's rhetorical ambivalence helped to sway anti-war domestic public opinion, it did not help to control the spiraling of Syria into civil war. That is to say, the ambivalent agenda building in the critical February 2012 episode perpetuated paradoxes in Turkey's Syria policy and left lingering implications for the transformation of the Syrian crisis in the years to come.

This article explores the discursive reasons behind the paradoxes in Turkey's foreign policy since the onset of the Syria crisis. By looking at representation of Turkey's Syria policy in two prominent pro-government newspapers, Star and Yeni Safak, the authors highlight the significance of the February 2012 episode, after which Ankara experienced deep discursive dilemmas for three reasons: the uncertain portrayal of the dyadic context, the ambiguous framing of third-party roles, and ambivalent agenda building. Despite the shadow of imminent civil war, Turkey's foreign policy elite refrained from framing the real risks arising within Syria. Idealistic-normative calls appealed to massacre rhetoric in order to legitimize humanitarian intervention. However, the geopolitical framing of third-party roles did not assist in the building of diplomatic ground for international intervention. Quite the contrary, it led to the shaping of public opinion toward realistic-utilitarian interference. Swinging between intervention and interference, Ankara pushed itself toward a liminal position. Even though the Turkish government's rhetorical ambivalence helped to sway anti-war domestic public opinion, it did not help to control the spiraling of Syria into civil war. That is to say, the ambivalent agenda building in the critical February 2012 episode perpetuated paradoxes in Turkey's Syria policy and left lingering implications for the transformation of the Syrian crisis in the years to come.