Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article engages the views of PRC Confucian scholars who responded to the United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy's citing of Confucius in his majority opinion on same-sex marriage in 2015. It questions their separation of tolerance for homosexuality from legalization of same-sex marriage and argue that tolerance is not enough. The arguments in the mainland Confucian discourse about same-sex marriage highlights the historical and persistent entanglement of Confucianism with patriarchy. Instead of reviving traditional patriarchal society, further entrenching and increasing gender inequality, contemporary Confucianism could shape its own unique modern society that aspires to (and hopefully one day achieving) gender equality together with sexual inclusivity by deconstructing the patriarchal Confucian family and reconstructing a different Confucian family ideal. Accepting same-sex marriage would lend weight to the latter, and there are Confucian reasons for legalizing same-sex marriage and recognizing its ethical value.

Given the historical association of Confucianism, or rather the Ru school of thought, with autocratic government since the Han dynasty, one of the challenges for contemporary scholars of Confucianism is to interpret and reconstruct Confucianism to guard against authoritarian tendencies without surrendering its distinctive ethical-political vision. Confucianism is incompatible with the conventional understanding of democracy as liberal democracy best represented by the United States, focused on limiting government with checks and balances, prioritizing protection of the civil and political rights of individuals, regular elections of representatives in which partisan competition for power offers citizens very little real choice, and it is debatable if the changes of political party in power have improved the lives of ordinary Americans, whichever side they support. This model of democracy is premised on possessive individualism, which assumes individuals to be fundamentally separate from one another, the only legitimate valuable social relationships are those each enters into by choice, and government is legitimized by citizens' consent and a social contract. Its politics is focused on relationships of conflict and competition, and cooperation is possible and justified only from an individualistic self-interested perspective.

No serious scholar today denies the close relationship between politics and ethics in Confucian thought and practice.

American philosopher John Dewey spent more than two years in China (191 During and after his visit, he wrote some fairly perceptive and insightful comme on China. These were published in periodicals such as the New Republic, As the China Review, and sometimes in newspapers such as the Baltimore Sun ever, there is hardly any discussion of Chinese philosophy in Dewey's publ works or even his papers and correspondence. Among his rare mentions of C philosophy was an article published in 1922, "As the Chinese Think," w cussed the teachings of Lao Zi and Confucius (M13:217-27).1 This was an att improve Western (or at least American) understanding of Chinese attitude tions in international negotiations and business. It describes the influence of cianism and Daoism as merging "to create a definite contempt for politics aversion to government as the West understands the term" (M13:225). It goe describe the Chinese polity in these words

My response to Tully's article, "Deparochializing Political Theory and Beyond," suggests that before introducing students in Asia to comparative political thought, including texts from Asian traditions in Political Theory or Philosophy courses, their education needs to first engage in the critical practice of questioning their own "background horizon of disclosure." The background horizon of disclosure that needs questioning certainly is not simply constituted by Asian traditions; despite westernized education, it is also not entirely western, insofar as the society they live in continues to be Asian in various ways, and the adopted western institutions and modes of thought have been modified in practice and interaction with local traditions.

Contemporary philosophers working on Chinese Philosophy, Confucianism in particular, disagree about the status of metaphysics in early Confucianism. Some maintain that metaphysics are absent by pointing to the overwhelming emphasis on practical concerns – ethical and political – in the early Confucian texts. Others insist that even if there were no explicit metaphysical discussion or theorizing, metaphysical assumptions are inevitable. However do these assumptions point to one definite metaphysical system, or are they so vague and ambiguous that different mutually incompatible metaphysics could be constructed from them and attributed arbitrarily to the early Confucians? The latter situation would weaken the connection between ethics and metaphysics in early Confucianism but could work to its benefit insofar as contemporary viability is concerned, since "metaphysical flexibility" means that in case whatever metaphysical assumptions made by early Confucian thinkers turn out to be unacceptable today in some way, it would then be possible to substitute a different acceptable or more defensible metaphysics to support the ethical claims, if one believes that any viable ethical claims require a coherent and viable metaphysics.

This article challenges the conventional view that Confucianism has no place for the value of equality by shifting the focus from direct justification of equality (Why equality?) to concerns about actual social and political problems (Which inequalities are objectionable?). From this perspective, early Confucian texts endorse some inequalities, in particular those based on virtue, while objecting to others, especially socioeconomic inequalities. Confucians do not consider equality or inequality as inherently valuable, but evaluate them in relation to issues of good government.

This paper examines attempts to find a conception of justice in early Confucian contexts, focusing on the concept of yi (translated as 'appropriateness', 'right', 'rightness', even 'justice') in the Mencius. It argues against the approach of deriving principles of dividing burdens and benefits from the discussions of concrete cases employing the concept of yi and instead shows that Confucian ethical concerns are more attentive to what kinds of interpersonal relations are appropriate in specific circumstances. It questions the exclusive emphasis in justice-centred ethical discourse on assessing actions, and even more narrowly actions of governments and other public institutions, and their consequences regarding distribution of rights and material resources and goods. Instead of applying some abstract principles of justice, whether of equality or some other priorities according to individual characteristics, distributive problems are approached from the perspective of the effect of any proposed distribution on interpersonal relationships. Principles of justice treat opportunities, resources, and goods that are supposed to be distributed as possessions or potential possessions of individuals always competing for resources and goods. Confucians treat them not as objects to be possessed by one and denied to others, but as facilitators of personal cultivation effecting appropriate interpersonal relationships constituting harmonious communities. The Mencius offers a different perspective on distributive problems by shifting our ethical attention from 'who gets what?' to 'how should we relate to others?' within a different conception of the good life and the ideal society or polity.