Suchergebnisse

AbstractGiardia is a zoonotic gastrointestinal parasite responsible for a substantial global public health burden, and quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) is often used to forecast and manage this burden. QMRA requires dose–response models to extrapolate available dose–response data, but the existing model for Giardia ignores valuable dose–response information, particularly data from several well‐documented waterborne outbreaks of giardiasis. The current study updates Giardia dose–response modeling by synthesizing all available data from outbreaks and experimental studies using a Bayesian random effects dose–response model. For outbreaks, mean doses (D) and the degree of spatial and temporal aggregation among cysts were estimated using exposure assessment implemented via two‐dimensional Monte Carlo simulation, while potential overreporting of outbreak cases was handled using published overreporting factors and censored binomial regression. Parameter estimation was by Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation and indicated that a typical exponential dose–response parameter for Giardia is r = 1.6 × 10−2 [3.7 × 10−3, 6.2 × 10−2] (posterior median [95% credible interval]), while a typical morbidity ratio is m = 3.8 × 10−1 [2.3 × 10−1, 5.5 × 10−1]. Corresponding (logistic‐scale) variance components were σr = 5.2 × 10−1 [1.1 × 10−1, 9.6 × 10−1] and σm = 9.3 × 10−1 [7.0 × 10−2, 2.8 × 100], indicating substantial variation in the Giardia dose–response relationship. Compared to the existing Giardia dose–response model, the current study provides more representative estimation of uncertainty in r and novel quantification of its natural variability. Several options for incorporating variability in r (and m) into QMRA predictions are discussed, including incorporation via Monte Carlo simulation as well as evaluation of the current study's model using the approximate beta‐Poisson.

THE CENTRALITY OF WOODROW WILSON IN THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR IS A COMMONPLACE. THERE WAS A STRIKING AFFINITY BETWEEN WILSON AND THE PUBLIC WHICH MEANT THAT WHERE THE PUBLIC WAS EITHER UNCERTAIN OR DEEPLY DIVIDED IN ITS CERTAINTY, WILSON HAD A DECISIVE INFLUENCE. HE WAS THE CASTING VOTE OF THE NATION. AT HOME AS WELL AS ABROAD, HE HELD THE BALANCE OF POWER OVER THE ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE. THE CRUCIAL DECISIONS WERE HIS ALONE TO MAKE FOR HIS WAS THE ONLY VOICE THAT NATION AS A WHOLE LISTENED TO DURING THE YEARS OF NEUTRALITY. IN REACHING THESE DECISIONS, WILSON KEPT A POSITION OF VIRTUAL ISOLATION AS FEW PRESIDENTS HAVE. HAD THE CASE BEEN OTHERWISE, HAD WILSON BEEN DISPOSED TO TREAT WITH OTHERS ON THE BASIS OF GIVE AND TAKE, THE OUTCOME OF THIS CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN, AND IN WORLD, HISTORY MIGHT HAVE BEEN QUITE DIFFERENT.

THE AUTHOR OFFERS CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAKE THE POINT THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE UTILITY OF POLITICAL REALISM. HE SUGGESTS THAT IF REALISM DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE WHOLE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IT STILL EXPLAINS A GREAT DEAL. EVEN MORE, IT ENCOURAGES AN OUTLOOK TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY THAT IS SORELY NEEDED IN A TIME OF TRIUMPHALISM AND UNBOUNDED OPTIMISM. HE CONCLUDES THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT IT WILL GAIN THE HEARING THAT IT DESERVES.

THE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT THAT HAS TRADITIONALLY CAST DOUBT ON THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES--OR ANY COUNTRY--TO MAKE THE WORLD ANEW IS "REALISM." REALISM HAS BEEN ATTACKED FOR HUNDREDS OF YEARS, AND DESPITE RECURRENT ONSLAUGHTS FROM LIBERALS, MARXISTS, PACIFISTS, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, DECONSTRUCTIONISTS, AND OTHERS, IT PERSISTS AS THE FUNDAMENTAL METHOD OF ANALYZING WORLD POLITICS. THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES: THE CAUSES OF WAR; THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM; THE CHALLENGE FROM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISM; SOURCES OF OPTIMISM; THE PROBLEM OF PEACEFUL CHANGE; AND, MORALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY. AFTER THIS EXAMINATION IT CONCLUDES THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RETURN TO SECURING AMERICAN POWER AND INTERESTS, AND TO STRENGTHENING THE CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ACROSS THE WORLD. IN THAT ORDER.

THE WAR IN BOSNIA HAS OCCASIONED THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT DEBATE OVER FOREIGN POLICY OF THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD. THE DEBATE OVER BOSNIA HAS BEEN MARKED BY A DISJUNCTION BETWEEN INTERESTS AVOWED AND COSTS REJECTED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN MARKED BY A VIEW OF THE WAR'S ORIGINS THAT MUST YEILD A DISTORTED PICTURE OF THE INTERESTS THAT ARE AT STAKE. THIS ARTICLE SUGGESTS THAT THE GREAT INTEREST AT STAKE IN BOSNIA IS NEITHER MORE NOR LESS THAN ORDER AND STABILITY IN POST-COLD WAR EUROPE. IT CONCLUDES THAT IF A PERSUASIVE CASE CANNOT BE MADE ON THESE GROUNDS, IT PROBABLY CANNOT BE MADE AT ALL.