Suchergebnisse

AbstractWe study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.

The opening of a new metro station, as a mode of the transportation corridor, potentially could have different effects on housing prices. We have investigated its effect on the value of residential properties around those stations, using data from large expansions of the metro network in Tehran, Iran. In the period of our study (April 2010 to December 2018), forty-five metro stations were inaugurated in Tehran. We use a difference-in-difference regression method to identify the causal effect of interest, where adjacent properties are used as the treatment group and similar but distant properties as the control group. The results indicate that, on average, the adjacent properties are affected by a 3.7 percent increase in price relative to distant properties. We also extend our study by categorizing new metro stations according to the extent of ex-ante access to other modes of public transportation such as bus rapid transit (BRT). We find 2 to 11 percent positive effect of new metro stations in regions with lower public transport, while in regions with ex-ante extensive public transportation system, we find less than 2 percent positive effect.