Suchergebnisse

Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Illustrations; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; 1 Introduction; 2 Formal leadership: a rational institutionalist theory; 3 The institutional development of the EU Presidency: a search for efficient cooperation; 4 The EU Presidency as agenda manager: shaping political priorities; 5 The EU Presidency as broker: constructing intergovernmental bargains; 6 The EU Presidency as representative: negotiating on behalf of others; 7 Comparative perspectives: formal leadership in multilateral negotiations; 8 Conclusion.

Examines the influence of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice in the political and legal enforcement of member state compliance in the EU.

AbstractWhat grants influence in the European Council? Drawing on general theories of negotiation, this article isolates and illustrates three complementary sources of bargaining power in the European Council: state sources of power, institutional sources of power and individual sources of power. It reports the results of a unique series of elite interviews with European heads of state and government, foreign ministers and top‐level civil servants. Elite testimonies suggest that the state dimension of power is the most fundamental, whereas the institutional and individual dimensions of power play a secondary role and mainly mediate the impact of structural power asymmetries.

AbstractThe exercise of leadership by the chairs of multilateral negotiations has so far received limited systematic attention in scholarship on international cooperation. This article addresses this gap by presenting a rational institutionalist theory of formal leadership that provides answers to three central questions: Why do states delegate powers of process control to the chairmanship of international negotiations? What are the power resources of formal leaders? And when, why and how do negotiation chairs wield influence over the outcomes of multilateral bargaining? The theory suggests that chairmanships are empowered to fulfil functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation in international bargaining; identifies procedural control and privileged information as essential power resources of negotiation chairs; and isolates the conditions under which formal leaders shape the efficiency and distributional implications of multilateral bargaining. The article ends by outlining an alternative theoretical approach to formal leadership, drawn from sociological institutionalism.