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Basing on the analysis of discussions around industrial policy definitions and justifications, the paper suggests a new conception of industrial policy: it is an assemblage of government's intentions to make up good economy and tools to effectuate the intentions. The variety of the meanings of the term "good economy" and cognitive patterns that can influence the understanding adopted by government are analyzed. The results of recent positive researches which revealed some economies' structural features that promote economic resilience and competitiveness are summarized. It is shown that the achievement of these structural features can contradict some governments' political goals.

The paper analyzes the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour opportunities in the planning processes. The following types of planning are distinguished: self-planning, collective planning, planning on behalf (or by contract), and directive (or prescriptive) planning. It is shown that any type of it excluding self-planning generates incentives to opportunistic behavior. Within this frame-work, two popular approaches in the planning theory are analyzed: participative planning and communicative one; it is shown that they are open to opportunism too. Basing on this analysis, the spheres of economy where government planning can be more efficient than market coordination mechanism are outlined.

The paper is devoted to the critical analysis of today's mainstream approach to the inclusion of the factor of culture in economic research. National culture is treated in this framework as a reified entity measured by societal values and is persistently included as a "culture code" throughout different contexts. The paper presents evidence contradicting this treatment, and an alternative methodology for economic analysis of cultural phenomena is suggested, namely that each mass cultural practice should be analyzed on a "case-by-case" basis, comparing stakeholders' costs and benefits.

The paper is aimed to analyze the validity of statements encountering in the literature that the content of objective public interests are public and merit goods, and that features of these ones determinate the necessity of public budgeting for these goods' provision. The history of the aforementioned notions and their role in the public finance theory development are analyzed. It is shown that the linkage between public goods and public interests is postulated but its practical verifications are absent.

Challenges in the sphere of financial regulation created by the global crisis of 2008-2009 are discussed. Advantages of the mechanism based on strict liability rules for deterring economic agents negligent behavior on financial markets are validated. The possibilities for applying the mechanism in the sphere of state regulation are analyzed.

The problem of institutions emergence is studied in the paper from the methodological individualism perspective. Special attention is paid to spontaneous emergence of institutions, the model "expectation (forecast) - break of expectation - frustration - aggression (punishment)" is suggested. The situations of institutions emergence via voluntary agreement and via compulsory adoption are also analyzed. It is shown that in all the cases institutions emergence can be explained basing on the methodological individualism perspective.

Treating the money as "under-way-contracts", or "under-executed contracts", the author describes its properties as an economic good. It is shown that the money is a private good with valuable externalities, i.e. a merit good. From this fact the necessity of financial markets state regulation oriented at minimizing negative externalities by restriction of using the most risky contracts is drawn.

The paper considers the role of goals in the strategies of socio-economic development. The problems of choice of goals' indicators and their influence on government administration processes are discussed. The general framework is adapted to possible goals' systems of four strategies: "Inertia", "Renter", "Mobilization", and "Modernization". The structure of supporting goals for the latter is detailed.

The notion of development program is defined as the unity of investment and institutional-change components. Basing on the principles of institutional design the bargaining process for development programs formation is grounded, with influential stakeholders as parties of this bargain. The typology of compensations is introduced, and a generalized criterion of Caldor-Hicks is proposed for estimation of development programs efficacy. The illustrations from recent Russian practice are presented.

Prospects of the improvement of property rights protection in Russia are analyzed in the article through the prism of the economics of property rights. The level of independency of judiciary as a factor of property rights protection, and influence of the level of competition on the political market on judicial independency are stressed. Basing on the positive dynamics in Russia of the share of fiscal revenue that is not connected with value creation, the conclusion is drawn that there are great obstacles for improving the situation with property rights protection.

The directions of the change of economic mechanism of secondary education in Russia, some results of modern economics and the outcomes of school reforms in a number of foreign countries oriented at increasing competition among schools are considered in the paper. It is shown that expectations of better schooling quality due to economic mechanism change are to a large extent unsound: both theoretical arguments and international experience give evidence of serious risks that schooling quality will decrease as a result of competition among schools.

The attempt to configure general contours of the economic theory of government control and supervising activity is undertaken in the article. Basing on the prerequisite of the benevolent state, the author considers its function of prevention of occurrence and compensation of undesirable (harmful) externalities caused by activities of economic agents. The author classifies types of externalities and offers corresponding mechanisms of their internalization.