Suchergebnisse

Part I Smart Grid Economics -- Chapter 1 Economics of Smart Grid: Smart Grid, Time-dependent Pricing (Dynamic Pricing), Demand Response -- Part II Field Experimental Economics -- Chapter 2 Economics of Field Experiment: History of Field Experiment, especially in Energy and Environmental Economics -- Chapter 3 Dynamic Pricing: Purpose, Design, and Results of Field Experiment of Dynamic Pricing -- Chapter 4 Persistence and Habit Formation: Short-term and Long-term Effects of Conservation Request and Dynamic Pricing -- Chapter 5 Switching Cost and Information Friction: Status Quo Bias and Cognitive Incompleteness of Behavioral Change -- Chapter 6 Social Welfare Analysis: Cost-Benefit Ratio of Installing Smart Grid System -- Part III Toward Power System Restructuring -- Chapter 7 Power System Restructuring and Smart Grids.

We study a problem in which policymakers need to screen self-selected individuals by unobserved heterogeneity in social welfare gains from a policy intervention. In our framework, the marginal treatment effects and marginal treatment responses arise as key statistics to characterize social welfare. We apply this framework to a randomized field experiment on electricity plan choice. Consumers were offered welfare-improving dynamic pricing with randomly assigned take-up incentives. We find that price-elastic consumers—who generate larger welfare gains—are more likely to self-select. Our counterfactual simulations quantify the optimal take-up incentives that exploit observed and unobserved heterogeneity in selection and welfare gains. (JEL C93, D12, L11, L94, L98)

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Environmental Policies in the Power Sector -- Chapter 3. Features of Power Sectors -- Chapter 4. Analysis of Power System Operations with Non-Dominant Firms -- Chapter 5. Analysis of Power System Operations with a Dominant Firm and an Oligopolistic Industry -- Chapter 6. Investment in New Power Plants under Environmental Policies -- Chapter 7. Sustainable Transmission Investment -- Chapter 8. First-Best Policy and Decentralized Mechanisms.

This study discusses important aspects of policy modeling based on a leader-follower game of policymakers. We specifically investigate non-cooperation between policymakers and the jurisdictional scope of regulation via bi-level programming. Performance-based environmental policy under the Clean Power Plan in the United States is chosen for our analysis. We argue that the cooperation of policymakers is welfare enhancing. Somewhat counterintuitively, full coordination among policymakers renders performance-based environmental policy redundant. We also find that distinct state-by-state regulation yields higher social welfare than broader regional regulation. This is because power producers can participate in a single power market even under state-by-state environmental regulation and arbitrage away the CO2 price differences by adjusting their generation across states. Numerical examples implemented for a stylized test network illustrate the theoretical findings. ; Peer reviewed