Suchergebnisse

We examine empirically the relationship between the extent of redistribution and the components of the Mirrlees framework, with a focus on inherent inequality and government's redistributive preferences. We have constructed our income distribution variables from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, which provides information on both factor and disposable incomes. Our redistributive preference measure is constructed using the optimal tax formula for which we have collected data from various sources. In addition to traditional linear specifications, we use flexible methods to allow nonlinearities because pre-specified functional forms are not easy to justify in empirical investigations of the optimal tax framework. We study 14 advanced countries for approximately four decades and find support for the Mirrlees model: There is a positive relationship between factor-income inequality and the extent of redistribution. We also find a link between our redistributive-preference measure and the extent of redistribution.

We examine empirically the relationship between the extent of redistribution and the components of the Mirrlees framework, with a focus on inherent inequality and government's redistributive preferences. We have constructed our income distribution variables from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, which provides information on both factor and disposable incomes. Our redistributive preference measure is constructed using the optimal tax formula for which we have collected data from various sources. In addition to traditional linear specifications, we use flexible methods to allow nonlinearities because pre-specified functional forms are not easy to justify in empirical investigations of the optimal tax framework. We study 14 advanced countries for approximately four decades and find support for the Mirrlees model: There is a positive relationship between factor-income inequality and the extent of redistribution. We also find a link between our redistributive-preference measure and the extent of redistribution.

This article deals with Finnish incomes policy as a special type of political exchange between the social partners and the government. The continuity of this political exchange requires a common ground of values and trust. In the article, these prerequisites are characterized in terms of the concept of social capital. The article also emphasizes the importance of centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements as an important institutional framework within which the Finnish welfare state has evolved. Owing to the traditionally close relationship between centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements and welfare reforms, the end of centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements declared by one social partner – namely, the Confederation of Finnish Industries – is likely to affect not only the manner in which wages are negotiated in the future but also the tradition of political exchange between the social partners and the government.Cet article traite de la politique finlandaise des revenus comme d'un type particulier d'échange politique entre les partenaires sociaux et le gouvernement. La continuité de cet échange politique requiert une base commune de valeurs et de confiance. Dans cet article, ces conditions préalables sont caractérisées en recourant au concept de capital social. L'article souligne également l'importance de la négociation centralisée des accords sur la politique des revenus, en tant que cadre institutionnel important dans lequel se poursuit l'évolution de l'État-providence finlandais. En raison de la relation traditionnellement étroite entre les accords de politique des revenus issus d'une négociation centralisée, d'une part, et les réformes de l'État-providence, d'autre part, la fin de ces accords de politique des revenus issus d'une négociation centralisée, proclamée par un partenaire social – la Confédération des industries finlandaises –, devait affecter non seulement la manière dont les salaires seront négociés dans l'avenir, mais aussi la tradition de l'échange politique entre partenaires sociaux et gouvernement.Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit der finnischen Lohn- und Gehaltspolitik, die auf einer besonderen Form des politischen Austausches zwischen den Sozialpartnern und der Regierung beruht. Die Konti-nuität dieses politischen Austausches setzt eine Basis gemeinsamer Werte und des Vertrauens voraus, die wir als "Sozialkapital" bezeichnen. Ferner wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die zentral ausgehandelten Abkommen über die Lohn- und Gehaltspolitik einen wichtigen institutionellen Rahmen bilden, in dem sich der finnische Wohlfahrtsstaat entwickelt hat. Traditionell besteht in Finnland eine enge Beziehung zwischen zentral ausgehandelten Lohnabkommen und sozialen Reformen. Die Erklärung eines Sozialpartners – des finnischen Arbeitgeberverbands – keine zentralen Lohnabkommen mehr auszuhandeln, wird somit nicht nur einen Einfluss auf die Lohnverhandlungsmodalitäten haben, sondern auch auf die Tradition des politischen Austausches zwischen den Sozialpartnern und der Regierung.