Suchergebnisse

Classic, structurally determined corruption practices in Poland & the former USSR are compared with the current situation following the political reforms of the late 1980s. Violating distribution rules by self-interested activity, state socialist corruption (extortion, bribes), & legalized corruption (power elite privileges) is motivated by economics of scarcity. Systematic reforms have eliminated some corruption in vertical exchange in Poland, eg, open plundering of public property, but it is harder to combat the legal corruptions. Bureaucracy & private business are in a parasitic & symbiotic relationship, providing mutual benefits & cooperation. J. Sadler

After analysing the structural nature of the Polish crisis, Myrdal's model of economic underdevelopment as due to a self-reinforcing rather than self-correcting social process is applied to Poland. Poland's cumulative backwardness is a permanent rather than a transient feature of her economic, administrative and political life and affects the mass public as well as the leaders and middle-rank officials. Many of those who seek reforms do not support the political system, while many who support the political system do not favour reform. The predicament of how to break the vicious circle of self-perpetuating backwardness poses intractable problems for the reformers.

After analyzing the structural nature of the Polish crisis, Karl Gunnar Myrdal's model of economic underdevelopment as due to a self-reinforcing rather than self-correcting social process (Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, London: Duckworth, 1958) is applied to that country. Poland's cumulative backwardness is a permanent rather than a transient feature of her economic, administrative, & political life, & affects the mass public as well as the leaders & middle-rank officials. Many of those who seek reforms do not support the political system, while many who support the political system do not favor reform. The predicament of how to break the vicious circle of self-perpetuating backwardness poses intractable problems for the reformers. 1 Figure. HA

The patron-client relationships in a centralized, socialist system are neither pathological deviations nor remnants of post-capitalist heritage or feudal mentality. They are structural elements of the politico-economic system-a response from the lower units of the system to straitened channels of interest articulation and aggregation, severe scarcity, and super- centralization of the system. In extreme cases (such as Poland in the 1970s), they become something more than an addendum to the inefficient institutional system-they become a primary determinant of public policy itself. Analysis of various motivations that induce political and economic leaders to assume the role of patron leads to the conclusion that the concept of patron-client relationships is too narrow, in that it restricts the scope of the concept to the direct exchange of favors (a direct social exchange). If the focus of research is the operation of the political and economic system, the existence and the scope of informal transactions and parallel distributive process is of foremost importance, irrespective of the motives and rewards that clients and patrons get from these transactions.

In this article the authors reflect on human relations phenomena that were characteristic of Polish society in the second half of the 1980s. These phenomena were not new nor have they been observed solely in this society. They appear everywhere and are strengthened in times of scarcity. In Poland they were made more severe by the breakdown of the communist system and the crisis connected with the systemic transformation. This was characterized by a strong dualism involving: (1) the division of the social sphere into public and private; (2) the narrowing of the social sphere to the family, a network of friends, and informal ties—a division into 'own' and 'other'; (3) a concentration on the present and on immediacy, with a dislike and inability to plan, think, or act in categories of the future; and (4) disintegrational, competitive, aggressive attitudes and behaviors, with a climate of distrust and enmity in human relations, and the application of a dual ethic—one for one's 'own' people and another for 'others.' This amoral familism, which characterizes a society composed of a collection of extended small groups built around the family and enlarged by friends, neighbors, and colleagues, is opposed to the world of institutions and is conditioned by both history and culture. The authors consider it to be factor in social anomy.

It is argued that Polish society is significantly more traditional & premodern than many Western scholars have observed. The implementation of martial law in 1981 fragmented society into small, atomistic groups of relatives & friends whose bonds both protected them from the harsh economic downturns of the 1980s & rendered them politically ineffectual. The division between family members (& friends) & strangers resulted in an ethical dualism -- a situation best captured using Edward C. Banfield's notion of "amoral familism" ("The Moral Basis of a Backward Society," in Heidenheimer, Arnold J. [Ed], Political Corruption. Readings in Comparative Analysis, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1979), which Banfield employed to describe a traditional Italian peasant community. Any approach to understanding Poland must take into account the culture & social mores that have emerged in recent Polish history. W. Howard

This article aims at an assessment of the role played by the local leaders in Poland, the characteristic feature of the Polish politico-economic systems having a high degree of centralization. According to the basic principles of the system, the interests of the local communities and of particular local organizations are supposed to be subordinated to the national interests. On the basis of an empirical study in six medium-sized towns, it is shown that local leaders are partially able to overcome the limitation with which they are confronted. The system of vertical subordination is counterbalanced by a network of mutual contacts between the leaders in the community. This horizontal integration helps to pool the resources of the various organizations of the community and enables the leaders to pursue local interests and autonomously work out local policies.