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"The author has virtually incomparable experience in both providing trade policy advice to more than 25 countries on behalf of the World Bank and also publishing quality journal articles in most of those cases. In this volume, he focuses on his work on: (i) trade policies for countries making the transition from planned to market economies; (ii) his trade policy guideline papers for the World Bank on trade policies for poverty alleviation, uniform tariff policy, adjustment costs of trade liberalization, exchange rate overvaluation, globalization and technology transfer and rules of thumb on regional trade policies; (iii) multilateral, dynamic and environmental issues in trade policy using computable general equilibrium models; (iv) trade policy of the United States in the auto and steel industries; and (v) mathematical methods for modeling. The papers show an unusual combination of policy relevance, advice and impact, with rigor and international trade theory insights. The papers in this volume have appeared in many of the economics profession's more prestigious journals, including Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, the Journal of International Economics, International Economic Review, European Economic Review, Canadian Journal of Economics, Economic Inquiry, the Journal of Comparative Economic, Review of International Economics, World Economy, the Southern Economic Journal, the World Bank Economic Review, the Japanese Economic Review and the Latin American Journal of Economics. In this book, the author elaborates on the articles by discussing some of the policy contexts for the requests for the work from developing and transition countries to the World Bank, the key trade theory or policy insights, policy recommendations and conclusions and the policy impacts."--Publisher's website

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the key regulatory, market, and political failures that led to the 2008‐2009 US financial crisis and to suggest appropriate recommendations for reform.Design/methodology/approachThe approach is to examine the underlying incentives that led to the crisis and to provide supporting data to support the hypotheses.FindingsWhile Congress was fixing the savings and loan crisis, it failed to give the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac normal bank supervisory power. This was a political failure as Congress was using government sponsored enterprise (GSE) resources and the resources of narrow constituencies for their own advantage at the expense of the public interest. Second, in the mid‐1990s, to encourage home ownership, the Administration changed enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, effectively requiring banks to use flexible and innovative methods to lower bank mortgage standards to underserved areas. Crucially, this disarmed regulators and the risky mortgage standards then spread to other sectors of the market. Market failure problems ensued as banks, mortgage brokers, securitizers, credit rating agencies, and asset managers were all plagued by problems such as moral hazard or conflicts of interest.Originality/valueThe paper focuses on the political economy reasons for why Congress and US administrations provided these perverse incentives to the GSEs and banks to lower mortgage standards. It also proposes some innovative methods of improving bank regulation that address the regulatory capture problem.

This chapter examines the arguments for and against a uniform tariff structure. Arguments against uniformity are: terms of trade; 'strategic,' infant or restructuring industry considerations, revenue or balance of payments purposes, and tariffs as a negotiating tool at the WTO. Arguments in favor of uniformity are: political economy considerations; administrative convenience; and reduction of smuggling and corruption in customs. The author maintain that tariff uniformity is the best choice in practice. A uniform tariff conveys a number of advantages, the most important of which is that if the tariff is uniform, the gains to industry lobbying are much smaller (and may be negative), creating a kind of free-rider problem for the lobbying industry and dramatically reduces the incentive to lobby for protection. Then: (1) the level of protection is likely to be lower (the recent experience of Chile is a dramatic case in point); (2) there is a direct saving of resources from the reduced lobbying; (3) the reduction to the gains from lobbying for protection provides a vastly improved signal to valuable entrepreneurial talent which will thus be encouraged to create better and cheaper products; and (4) the reduction in resources devoted to lobbying will result in less corruption in government, which may have positive spillover effects into other dimensions of government activity.

ABSTRACTThis paper attempts to explain what influenced efficient decisions in the adoption of important technology in the steel industry. An index of efficient decisions for the adoption of the basic oxygen furnace and for continuous casting is discussed theoretically and then empirically developed for the steel industries of 28 and 27 countries respectively. Statistical tests are performed to determine the influence of government ownership of the steel industries, central planning of the economies and involvement in international competition on efficient decisions regarding technology adoption. The tests reveal that both government ownership and central planning retarded efficient decisions regarding the adoption of technology.

Effect of steel import quotas on competition; costs to the economy and the consumer.