Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper investigates how poverty reduction and natural resource preservation can be simultaneously achieved in a small open dual economy with urban wage rigidity, open access rural resources, and rural-urban migration. An increase in the export tax rate on the rural resource good increases urban unemployment in both the short run and the long run with resource dynamics. Given the institutional failures, the first-best policy is an urban wage subsidy combined with either a rural wage subsidy at alowerrate or, if the urban output price is sufficiently high, a ruraltax. When the institutional failures can be resolved endogenously, an increase in the export tax on the resource good can induce rural institutional change away from open access. However, tariff protection of urban manufacturing hinders such a rural institutional change.

Revenue decoupling (RD) is a regulatory mechanism that allows adjustments of retail electricity rates for the regulated utility to recover its required revenue despite fluctuations in its sales volume. The U.S. utility data in 2000–2019 reveals that RD is associated with about a 4-percentage point higher growth rate of residential electricity prices within the first year after RD is implemented relative to carefully matched non-decoupled utilities with similar pre-RD sales trends. Theoretically, unexpected sales declines would lead to higher electricity prices while unexpected sales increases would lead to lower prices. While RD adjustments have reportedly yielded both refunds and surcharges, our analysis indicates that electricity prices demonstrate downward rigidity and statistically significant upward adjustments for the utilities subject to RD. The asymmetric movement in retail prices may be associated with the political economy underlying the adoption and the implementation of RD.

AbstractWe examine the welfare consequences of an emission tax with and without a border tax adjustment (BTA) for an imperfectly competitive industry, where intra‐industry trade arises between countries. BTA allows a government to impose a pollution‐content tariff on imports and refund an emission tax for export sales. We analyse the structure of an optimal emission tax with BTA when a government chooses its emission tax rate to maximize its national welfare. We show that the optimal emission tax policy with BTA achieves greater national welfare and higher environmental quality than the optimal policy without BTA.