Suchergebnisse

This book offers a comprehensive overview of Japan's national security institutions and policy today, including a detailed discussion of Japan's regional security environment and its alliance with the United States in the context of the Democratic Party of Japan's rise to power in August 2009

In this paper, we assess the drivers of, and prospects for, further security cooperation in the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship. We argue that while balance of threat and capability gaps may restrain the pace of deepening Australian-Japan security relations, these gaps are diminishing and are, in any case, secondary to the specific shared interests we posit as the primary drivers of Australia-Japan security cooperation. These specific interests, however, are shaped not only by a commitment in both countries to liberal-based principles and freedoms at home and in inter-state relations, but also by a common awareness of the importance of continued US primacy to the ongoing maintenance of those interests. Thus, in the absence of any fundamental change in how Australia and Japan understand their respective interests and the US role in the region, Donald Trump's recent and unexpected election as US president notwithstanding, we conclude that the case for further security cooperation - via additional cross-bracing of their respective US alliance relationships - will almost certainly remain compelling for both countries. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Japan's nuclear weapons policy has long enjoyed a stable, if somewhat internally inconsistent, equilibrium. Anti-proliferation efforts co-exist with reliance upon the United States' nuclear deterrent, alongside dependence on a nuclear energy program robust enough to potentially support nuclear weapons capability. These policies have been promoted and maintained by Japan's bureaucracy rather than by political bargains, with their bureaucratic proponents separately stovepiped rather than organized into a coherent whole. But new developments appear to leave Japan's nuclear security policy – and its relations with the U.S. over this policy – in flux. New threats and changing public attitudes are gradually eroding taboos on nuclear weapons. New or newly energized political actors stand to amplify the impact of such public opinion shifts. A more actively nuclear Japan could destabilize the U.S.-Japan alliance, raise nuclear weapons levels in Asia, and undercut Japan's role as a model nonnuclear ally; on the other hand, new anti-nuclear sentiment could hinder ongoing U.S.- Japan nuclear dialogue. ; U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC)

Performer: Stimson Center Project Lead: Yuki Tatsumi Project Cost: $225,000 FY16–17 ; The project will investigate the development of disruptive technologies in Northeast Asia to assess the impact of these technologies on the United States' management of regional alliances and military strategy. The United States and China are both pursuing development of a full range of disruptive technologies, including hypersonic vehicles, cyber warfare capabilities, counterspace capabilities, and unmanned systems with state-of-the-art robotics technology. Simultaneously, emerging perceptions that the United States is losing its capacity as a security guarantor in the region have caused uncertainties in Japan and South Korea regarding the reliability of U.S. defense commitments. The increased risk of conflict makes it urgent that political and military leaders in these nations consider how disruptive technologies may affect the stability of Northeast Asia's security environment. ; PASCC

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. ; The discussions that the Stimson team began with defense policy experts in China, Japan, and South Korea covered topics that can be uncomfortable. Nonetheless, policymakers on both sides of the Pacific avoid these issues at their peril. Productive international relationships that contribute to regional stability and defuse potential crises - whether between allies or competitors - depend upon regular, candid conversations about the future of defense policy. During the First and Second Offset Strategies, the United States encountered difficulties in intra-alliance management through its failure to address technological gaps and diverging strategic interests with its allies, and by not clearly articulating U.S. strategy. As this report reveals from the discussions in Northeast Asia, allies and competitor alike are concerned with both the vagueness of America's strategy and its continuing technological strides. Voices of the present and lessons from the past inform the report's recommendations to deepen American engagement with Japan, South Korea, and China by clarifying strategic debates and improving communication and cooperation with allies. For spearheading this important research, we are indebted to Yuki Tatsumi, the Director of Stimson's Japan Program, whose expertise on Japanese defense policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance stimulated the development of this project. I would also like to thank Alex Bollfrass, a Nonresident Fellow at Stimson, who specializes in nuclear weapons and intelligence-related issues, for leading the roundtable discussions with the Northeast Asian defense community. Pamela Kennedy provided research support and guidance throughout the project lifecycle. Finally, I would like to thank the Naval Postgraduate School's Center on Contemporary Conflict, which operates the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD, and its Executive Director Dr. Michael Malley for their generous support of this project. ; Naval Postgraduate School