Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: General results
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 96, S. 37-48
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 96, S. 37-48
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 62, Heft 2, S. 95-100
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 84-97
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 410-438
In: The journal of business, Band 77, Heft 1, S. 1-8
ISSN: 1537-5374
In: The Manchester School, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 16-35
ISSN: 1467-9957
This paper presents a model of two competing local telecommunications networks which are mandated to interconnect. After negotiating the access charges, the companies engage in price competition. Given the prices, each consumer selects a network and determines the consumption of phone calls. Using a discrete/continuous consumer choice model, it is shown that a pure strategy equilibrium exists quite generally and satisfies desirable properties. This equilibrium can be implemented by a simple rule that sets the access charges at a common discount from the retail prices. It requires no information and the discount factor is chosen by the companies through negotiations. Finally, if the networks are highly substitute, the retail prices obtained by imposing this rule will approximate the efficient prices.
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 48, Heft 2, S. 223-233
In: The Manchester School, Band 72, Heft 5, S. 618-625
ISSN: 1467-9957
We show that a welfare maximizing planner in a Cournot oligopoly can easily implement the socially optimal outcome by offering the firms a per unit subsidy in return for upfront fees. The planner announces a subsidy and auctions it off to a limited number of firms. It is shown that if at least one firm is excluded and not subsidized, the socially optimal outcome can be achieved while the planner runs no deficit. The planner does not impose any regulation on the firms. They accept his offer willingly and voluntarily. Yet, every firm makes zero net profit and consumers extract the entire surplus.
In: The Manchester School, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 7-15
ISSN: 1467-9957
In this paper we compare and contrast the most profitable modes of licensing a cost‐reducing invention by an inventor who is an industry incumbent with one who is not. We find that an industry incumbent favors licensing by means of a royalty per unit of output to which the new technology is applied while an outsider prefers to auction off a fixed number of licences outright. Our analysis also suggests that an outside inventor finds it most profitable to target greater cost‐reducing inventions to monopolistic industries while an incumbent inventor favors competitive industries.
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 54, S. 124-143
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 108, S. 8-13
In: HKS Working Paper No. RWP20-026
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In: HKS Working Paper No. RWP18-006
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 340
ISSN: 1756-2171