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Brennan and Hamlin provide a normative justification for dispositional conservatism based on the concave value functions which give rise to quasi-risk aversion. This note modifies this argument for "analytic conservatism" by allowing jurisdictional exit i

Critics of the expressive account of voting have argued that it is inconsistent with strategic voting. Since there is strong evidence that people vote strategically, this has been taken to show that many voters are at least partially instrumentally motivated. This paper argues that strategic voting in the relevant sense is consistent with entirely expressive political motivation. Building on an earlier suggestion by Geoffrey Brennan, I model voters as expressively valuing ideological position as well as the strategic pursuit of expressively-defined preferences. This model predicts strategic voting without instrumental preferences entering the voter's calculus at all. I also suggest that expressive preferences for strategic behaviour can be usefully analysed in terms of dispositional choice.

Critics of the expressive account of voting have argued that it is inconsistent with strategic voting. Since there is strong evidence that people vote strategically, this has been taken to show that many voters are at least partially instrumentally motivated. This paper argues that strategic voting in the relevant sense is consistent with entirely expressive political motivation. Building on an earlier suggestion by Geoffrey Brennan, I model voters as expressively valuing ideological position as well as the strategic pursuit of expressively-defined preferences. This model predicts strategic voting without instrumental preferences entering the voter's calculus at all. I also suggest that expressive preferences for strategic behaviour can be usefully analysed in terms of dispositional choice.

AbstractDebates over the relationship between exit and voice in politics have focused on the quantity of citizen voice and its effectiveness in influencing public decisions. The epistemic quality of voice, on the other hand, has received much less attention. This article uses rational choice theory to argue that public sector exit options can lead to more informed and less biased expressions of voice. Whereas voters have weak incentives to gather and process information, exit options provide sharper epistemic incentives to produce knowledge which can spill over into voting decisions. Exit can thus improve democratic competence.

Cover -- Contents -- List of Boxes, Figuresand Tables -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Political economy to economics -- The emergence of rational choice ( 1950- 1970) -- The take- off to growth ( 1970- 1994) -- A difficult decade ( 1994- 2004) -- Major combat operations are over? ( 2004-) -- Chapter 2 James M. Buchanan and ConstitutionalPolitical Economy -- Setting the stage: the state as an escapefrom Hobbesian anarchy -- Exchange and the constitutional framework -- Choice within rules versus choice among rules -- The Calculus of Consent -- Covenants without the sword -- Assessment -- Chapter 3 Anthony Downs and the Spatial Theory of Party Competition -- Setting the stage: the demands of democracy -- The precursors of party competition -- The median voter theorem -- Qualifying the argument: accounting for divergence -- Assumption 1: there are only two parties -- Assumption 2: political space is one- dimensional -- Assumption 3: parties can move to and occupyany point in this one- dimensional space -- Assumption 4: parties are vote- maximizers -- Assumption 5: voters vote for the party closestto them in political space -- Assumption 6: there is perfect information -- Assumption 7: voters' preferences are fixed -- Assessment -- Chapter 4 William Riker and the Theoryof Coalitions -- Setting the stage: choosing a voting system -- Riker and the theory of the minimal- winningcoalition -- Policy- seeking parties -- The portfolio- allocation model -- The transaction costs of policy agreements -- Assessment -- Chapter 5 Kenneth Arrow and Social Choice Theory -- Setting the stage: democracy and the public will -- The precursors of social choice theory -- Arrow: social choice and individual values -- Riker: liberalism against populism -- The possibility of social choice -- Assessment -- Chapter 6 Mancur Olson and the Logic of Collective Action.

We argue that those advocating the reform of current political systems in order to promote jurisdictional competition are in a catch-22: jurisdictional competition has the potential to improve policy, but reforms to increase competition must be enacted by currently uncompetitive governments. If such governments could be relied upon to enact such reforms, they would likely not be necessary. Since existing governments are resistant to change, we argue that the only way to overcome the deep problem of reform is by focusing on the bare-metal layer of society - the technological environment in which governments are embedded. Developing the technology to create settlements in international waters, which we refer to as seasteading, changes the technological environment rather than attempting to push against the incentives of existing political systems. As such, it sidesteps the problem of reform and is more likely than more conventional approaches to significantly alter the policy equilibrium.

We argue that those advocating the reform of current political systems in order to promote jurisdictional competition are in a catch-22: jurisdictional competition has the potential to improve policy, but reforms to increase competition must be enacted by currently uncompetitive governments. If such governments could be relied upon to enact such reforms, they would likely not be necessary. Since existing governments are resistant to change, we argue that the only way to overcome the deep problem of reform is by focusing on the bare-metal layer of society - the technological environment in which governments are embedded. Developing the technology to create settlements in international waters, which we refer to as seasteading, changes the technological environment rather than attempting to push against the incentives of existing political systems. As such, it sidesteps the problem of reform and is more likely than more conventional approaches to significantly alter the policy equilibrium.