Suchergebnisse

SummaryThe proposed constitutional changes inGeorgiaenvision a transition from the current semi-residential system to that of a parliamentary republic. It appears that the Georgian ruling party is being guided by formal principles of associated with the parliamentary system, and not by the historical and social experience ofGeorgia. It is also likely that the parliamentary system is sought for parochial interests, not for the general well-being of the country. The paper argues that the parliamentary system of government is more likely to damage the nascent democratic institutions inGeorgia, create conditions for future instability, and reverse democratic development in the country.

Was the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, which resulted into a dismemberment of Georgia, predictable and avoidable? Supporters and ideological allies of the current Georgian government have insisted that those who criticize the alertness and behavior of the Saakashvili administration are looking at this issue with the full benefits of hindsight. To be fair, political scientists are much better at predicting the past than the future, and if we follow this logic, the future conflicts between the two neighbors in the Caucasus should be as "unpredictable" and "unexpected' as this one. The international system behaves very much like a stochastic system, but it does exhibit certain regularities and carries certain continuity when it comes to behavior of its actors. Despite weaknesses and problems unleashed by the era of globalization, nation-states remain the main actors of the international system. Survival continues to be the main value for these actors, and the system guides the nation-states or those who act on their behalf to do their utmost to preserve this value for themselves, and stay as actors in the system. States compete, jostle, combine, and sometimes even collide in order to accumulate enough power and capabilities to provide for their survival. States collide and fight not because they have different values in the international system, but as carriers of the same set of values they come to different understandings and perspectives of how to defend these values based on their individual geopolitical circumstances. Therefore, states may develop different, and often competing interests around the same issue, which occasionally throws them into violent conflicts. Just prior to the extraordinary presidential election in Georgia on 5 January, 2008, a Georgian language daily Resonansi (The Resonance) printed my op-ed piece titled "The Issue of Division of Abkhazia, and Theories of the Ruling Party," in which, among other things I warned that "If Saakashvili manages to stay in power, and the ruling party will do everything to keep its leader in the presidential seat, the most logical solution for the Abkhaz issue would be its division with Russia. It would be more beneficial for Georgia to keep the status of the autonomous republic undecided than to settle it by dividing [the province with Russia], as with a gradual weakening of Russia, Georgia should be able to recover the lost territories. However, in the event of its legal division with Russia, it would be almost impossible to recover the lost territory." Further I anticipated the province of Abkhazia to be divided by force between Russia and Georgia, and this to happen sometime before the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics: ".The Russians will try their best to act before Georgia does, and introduce troops to Abkhazia citing a prevention of aggression by Georgia. A provocation of sorts would be enough [for them] to argue that Georgia is planning aggression, and intends to thwart the [Sochi] Olympic Games. After the deployment of the [Russian] troops [to Abkhazia], it would take decades to dislodge them from that territory." Saakashvili did win the elections in January 2008, supported in large by a shameful behavior of the OSCE delegation in the country. In June 2008, he did propose secretly to Moscow to divide Abkhazia; 2 however, as the August events demonstrated, the Russians decided not to divide, but to keep the whole pie for themselves. The August escalation around Tskhinvali served as the pretext, but Abkhazia and its geopolitical setting is the biggest prize for the Russians, with which they will not easily part.

Globalization in international relations is perhaps best understood in terms of increased interdependence in the international system. This interdependence manifests itself in both economic and military affairs. Since World War II, the United States has been the leading force behind "globalizing" processes: as economic interdependence leads toward more open markets, and military interdependence makes global affairs more peaceful, it has been in the vital interest of Washington to rid the world of isolationist and militarily autarkic powers. With increased interdependence regional conflicts also have become politically globalized. No regional conflict today remains isolated to a particular region despite the fact that very few of them directly affect power hierarchy in the international system. Regional conflicts in part acquire their global significance due to a spread of the phenomenon loosely understood as "soft power." Since the dominant powers in today's world are either liberal democracies (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.) or trying to play the democratic game (Russia, China, India, etc.), the concepts associated with democratic ideals have become the major currency in soft power transactions. Therefore, regional actors have to pay attention to public opinion and cultural sensitivities prevalent in dominant global powers even though these powers may not be directly affected by regional conflicts. Soft power of public opinion and ideals of international justice and freedom may well push and/or allow hard power to step in to quell or mediate by force a protracted conflict, and this could have disastrous consequences for one or both parties involved in a regional dispute. The rise of soft power has made such concept as "victory" and "resolution of conflict" more political rather than military phenomena. As the Bush administration found out in 2003, a proclamation of military victory may amount to little if it is not politically endorsed or acknowledged by the others who may have stakes in such an outcome. Substantial dissention in regional or global public opinion may well result in a protracted and rather costly conflict, especially if a proclaimed military victory does not look that decisive. The "frozen" conflict of the Upper Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not and cannot be isolated from globalizing trends. In fact, one could argue that the very fact this and other similar conflicts are frozen reflects the preferences of dominant global powers in the international system. Violent regional wars go against the notions of global "security," and "stability," especially the latter, since it implies, to a large degree, preservation of a status quo. In this sense, national interests of those directly involved in the frozen conflicts may well contradict priorities and interests of those powers who prioritize "stability" in order to better promote interdependence in trade, and predictability in military affairs. Almost everywhere "frozen conflict" does imply closed borders and military stand-off, but even such circumstances would be preferable to damaging upheavals that accompany attempts to regain or conquer lost territories by force. For better or for worse, the Karabakh conflict is part of the international system, although its eventual direct outcome may only influence power game at a regional level—in the Caucasus and/or Caspian Basin. However, if the parties to this conflict were to resort to military force to solve the Karabakh issue, regional (Turkey, Iran), and global (U.S., Russia) powers will not stay away as the fact of upsetting the status quo itself will affect their interests in some. On the other hand, the regional and global powers are interdependent through positive trade and alliance links or negative military stand-offs, and they will be tempted to gain the upper hand in some of the issues of their mutual interest through an expanded participation in a power game in the Caucasus.

Eurasia, a geopolitical conceptual construct of the 20th century, has been analyzed from diverse perspectives. Many distinguished scholars have contributed to this effort. Such analytical exercises inevitably call for further study and commentary on complex dynamics of Eurasian political and economic processes. This global corner currently attracts substantial international attention from great powers and small players alike. Global geopolitical corners have historically been defined by great powers involved in theatrics of international struggle. International politics cannot avoid clashes of interests among participants; such is the nature of the international system composed of nation-states. Currently, the Russian Federation and the United States of America vying to have their vision of regional order prevail in Eurasia. Fortunately, their competition lacks drama of the Cold War, but is no less important, especially for the Eurasian countries directly affected by potential outcomes. To a considerable extent, Moscow and Washington continue espousing incompatible ways of doing global politics. The Russians still see the world divided among discrete spheres of influence, resembling the divisions of the Cold War. Such perceptions of the divided world are no longer global in scope, and not necessarily as rigid as they used to be, but ultimately Moscow's conception of great power rests on controlled access to geographic space they could call solely their own. On the other hand, the Americans continue to be committed to the ideas of the open world, free markets, and economic exchange unimpeded by political roadblocks. Washington has been largely married to such a vision since the 1940s, and American foreign policy makers have consistently and deliberately pursued policies that encourage maximum openness and interdependency in the world. Clash between these two visions largely determines the boundaries of Eurasia as a geopolitical construct, and its outcomes will be paramount for the overall direction of its many political processes.

The 5 January, 2008 snap poll was the first ever truly competitive presidential election in Georgia. The incumbent, Mikhail Saakashvili, just managed to retain his seat, narrowly avoiding a run-off with the main opposition candidate, Levan Gachechiladze. According to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) of Georgia, and the exit polls commissioned by government controlled television companies, Saakashvili received between 50.8 and 54 percent of votes, while Gachechiladze stayed below 30 percent. Local and international observers have noted numerous irregularities, but overall they have endorsed the elections as democratic. Opposition parties, however, have been less than convinced in fairness of the results as they have insisted that the current outcome is, indeed, a result of the noted irregularities. The snap presidential poll is a step forward for Georgian democracy, with credible opposition now emerging in the country. Both Saakashvili and the main opposition camps have made some gains. The main set-back for democracy was the suppression of Imedi TV, the only nongovernment controlled nationwide television channel. The January 2008 poll was the culmination of a very tense stand-off between the government and the opposition, which started in September 2007 with shocking revelations from a former defense minister Okruashvili. The stand-off reached its climax on 7 November, 2007, when the special forces of the Ministry of Interior brutally dispersed a mass rally in the center of Tbilisi, and the government imposed the state of emergency, suspending all news broadcast by TV and radio media, and closing down all but a couple television and radio channels. The November 2007 events demonstrated a huge erosion of popular support to once widely admired Georgian President Saakashvili. The latter, who was swept into power by similar mass rallies four years earlier, won his previous poll with more than 90 percent of the vote. The 2003 mass rallies, which was subsequently dubbed as the Rose Revolution, saw the resignation of then President Shevardnadze, followed by the snap January 2004 presidential elections, which Saakashvili won with overwhelming popular support. Since then, U.S.-educated Saakashvili has been billed a revolutionary pro-Western reformer, whose fiery anti-Russian rhetoric has appealed to many in Georgia. To save his regime from a complete isolation and collapse, Saakashvili had no other logical choice but to call for a snap poll, either presidential or parliamentary. He opted for the former, as his National Movement, which currently holds majority of seats in the parliament is even less popular than him, and besides, it was the spring parliamentary elections the organizers of the mass rallies in Tbilisi were calling for in the first place. Saakashvili's gamble has won him a short respite and some credibility, but in the long run he will likely be a lame duck of Georgian politics.

The 24 March, 2005 Tulip Revolution has pointed out some of the most pressing problems that Kyrgyzstan currently faces. The Akaev administration was brought down by a popular uprising, which was occasioned more by economic hardship and deprivation than by political oppression. As a consequence, the post-revolutionary Kyrgyz leadership has inherited very acute economic and financial problems that they will have to address in order to avoid future public outbursts of fury. Kyrgyzstan's stability and future development, however, does not solely depend on its leadership. The country's relationship with powerful international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has no less significance for its future economic prospects, and political maturity. So far, these two organizations did nothing but damage in Kyrgyzstan, as they have undermined economic and social fabric of the country, and effectively prepared a fertile ground for the March 2005 crisis. The Central Asian region is politically volatile, and economically remote. Kyrgyzstan faces potentially very violent political challenges from Islamic extremists and criminal groups. After the Tulip Revolution, these challenges continued to be magnified by economic hardship and deprivation of its population. Unless the new Kyrgyz leadership exercises caution, and due diligence in its economic policies, their blind following of the IMF and WTO guidance may ruin the country, and lead it toward more political violence.

Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision
Making, Alex Mintz, ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 175Heuristic method uses formal reasoning that is based on experience,
often because there is no precise and/or relevant algorithm available.
Heuristic reasoning is guided by trial and error. It is convincing without
being rigorous. Heuristic method is basically a rule of thumb or other
simplifications that allow drawing conclusions without being certain.