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Поступила в редакцию: 31.05.2020. Принята к печати: 14.07.2020. ; Submitted: 31.05.2020. Accepted: 14.07.2020. ; Историки достаточно много писали о том, что Наполеон Бонапарт, начиная в 1798 г. свой Египетский поход, взял с собой все необходимое для того, чтобы познакомить египтян с передовыми достижениями европейской цивилизации. Гораздо реже в историографии упоминается о том, что Наполеон привез с собой на Ближний Восток и такой ее «дар», как революционный террор. Именно террор из всех «достижений» революционной Франции нашел там наиболее активное применение. Поняв, что ни реверансы в отношении Пророка Мухаммеда, ни антимамлюкский дискурс не обеспечивают французам симпатий мусульман Египта, Бонапарт пустил в ход террор, который не прекращался ни на день на протяжении всего периода оккупации. Политика запугивания населения оккупационными властями носила систематический характер, хотя при этом и сочеталась с различного рода показными жестами главнокомандующего, рассчитанными на завоевание симпатий мусульманской элиты. Происходило своего рода разделение обязанностей: Бонапарт пытался обаять влиятельных шейхов мечети аль-Азхар, устраивал для них обеды, вел ученые беседы об исламе и одаривал подарками, а полиция из местных христиан и магрибских наемников изо дня в день терроризировала жителей Каира и его окрестностей, по своему произволу убивая невинных людей, чтобы запугать всех остальных. C отъездом Бонапарта из Египта, когда во главе Восточной армии встал Клебер, террор не прекратился, а лишь изменил свой характер с постоянного на ситуативный. После смерти Клебера его преемник генерал Мену опять придал террору постоянный характер. Именно политика террора и позволила крошечному меньшинству в тридцать тысяч человек на протяжении трех лет удерживать власть над несколькими миллионами жителей страны, почти в два раза превышавшей размерами Францию. ; Historians have written quite a lot about the fact that, starting in 1798 with his Egyptian campaign, Napoleon Bonaparte took everything necessary with him to acquaint the Egyptians with the advanced achievements of the European civilization. However, historiography quite rarely mentions that Napoleon brought another "gift" to the Middle East in the form of revolutionary terror. Out of all the achievements of revolutionary France, it was terror that was most actively used there. Having realised that neither praises of Prophet Muhammad nor anti-Mamluk discourse provided the French with sympathies of the Muslims of Egypt, Bonaparte used la terreur, which did not stop for a day during the entire period of occupation. The policy of intimidation of the population by the occupants was systematic, although it was combined with various ostentatious gestures of the commander-in-chief designed to win the sympathy of the Muslim elite. There was a kind of division of responsibilities: Bonaparte tried to charm the influential sheikhs of the al-Azhar mosque, invited them to dinners, conversed with them about Islam, and gave them gifts; at the same time, the police made up by local Christians and Maghreb mercenaries day after day terrorised the inhabitants of Cairo and its environs, arbitrarily killing innocent people to intimidate everyone else. With the departure of Bonaparte from Egypt, when Kleber took charge of the Oriental army, terror did not stop, but only changed its character from permanent to situational. Following Kleber's death, his successor, General Menou once again gave terror a permanent nature. It was the policy of terror that allowed a tiny minority of thirty thousand people to hold power over several million people in a country almost twice the size of France for three years. ; The study is funded by the Russian Science Foundation, grant 20-18-00113 "Man at War: The Anthropology of Military History of the Napoleonic Era". ; Статья подготовлена при финансовой поддержке Российского научного фонда, проект № 20-18-00113 «Человек на войне: антропология военной истории Наполеоновской эпохи».

Поступила в редакцию 25.01.2019. Принята к печати 18.04.2019. ; Submitted on 25 January, 2019. Accepted on 18 April, 2019. ; Исследование посвящено истории убийства 14 июня 1800 г. в Каире видного французского военачальника периода революционных войн, командующего Восточной армией в Египте Жан-Батиста Клебера сирийцем Сулейманом ал-Халеби. Проведенное оккупационными властями следствие заключило, что заказчиком преступления был великий визирь Османской империи Юсуф-паша, стремившийся якобы отомстить Клеберу за недавний разгром тем турецких войск в сражении при Гелиополисе. В дальнейшем эта версия некритически воспроизводилась и многочисленными историками, так или иначе затрагивавшими данный сюжет. Впервые введя в научный оборот чрезвычайно информативный архивный источник — донесения российского дипломата Э. Франкини из турецкой ставки, автор статьи показывает, что для Юсуф-паши убийство Клебера не только стало абсолютной неожиданностью, но и полностью нарушило стратегические планы великого визиря по освобождению Египта от французской оккупации. Констатация этого факта начисто опровергает устоявшееся мнение о причастности Юсуф-паши к смерти французского военачальника. Главными же бенефициарами преступления стали Первый консул Франции Наполеон Бонапарт и преемник Клебера на посту главнокомандующего Восточной армией генерал Абдулла-Жак Мену. Это событие избавило Бонапарта от перспективы скорого возвращения во Францию брошенной им в Египте, а потому раздраженной против него армии с враждебно настроенным по отношению к нему генералом во главе. Мену же получил возможность предпринять опыт по колонизации Египта, горячим сторонником которой он был. Хотя 219 лет спустя после совершения преступления достоверно установить его организаторов не представляется возможным, применение принципа qui prodest? позволяет снять подобное обвинение с великого визиря и, напротив, оставляет под подозрением Бонапарта и Мену. ; This study examines the assassination of Jean-Baptiste Kléber, a prominent French General of the Revolutionary Wars period, commander-in-chief of the Oriental Army in Egypt by Suleiman al-Khalebi, a Syrian, on June 14, 1800 in Cairo. The investigation carried out by the occupation authorities concluded that Yusuf Pasha, the Grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire, was the one who put out the crime, as he supposedly sought revenge on Kléber for the recent defeat of the Turkish forces in the battle of Heliopolis. Later, this version was also uncritically reproduced by numerous historians who in one way or another narrated this story. Exploring for the first time such a highly informative archive source as reports of Russian diplomat Frankini from the Turkish headquarters, the author of the article shows that for Yusuf Pasha, the assassination of Kléber was not only an absolute surprise, but also completely violated his strategic plan to liberate Egypt from the French occupation peacefully. The statement of this fact completely refutes the established opinion on the involvement of Yusuf Pasha in the assassination of the French commander. The main beneficiaries of the crime were the First Consul of France Napoleon Bonaparte and General Abdullah-Jacques Menou, Kléber's successor as commander-in-chief of the Oriental Army. This event saved Bonaparte from the prospect of a prompt return to France of the army abandoned by him in Egypt and therefore irritated against him, which was led by a general utterly hostile towards him. Menou got an opportunity to colonise Egypt, which he ardently supported. Though 219 years after the crime it is impossible to reliably establish its organisers, the application of the qui prodest? principle allows us to exonerate the Grand vizier from blame and, on the contrary, leaves Bonaparte and Menou under suspicion. ; Исследование осуществлено по гранту Правительства Российской Федерации в рамках подпрограммы «Институциональное развитие научно-исследовательского сектора» государственной программы Российской Федерации «Развитие науки и технологий» на 2013–2020 гг. Договор № 14.Z50.31.0045. ; The study was sponsored by a grant of the Government of the Russian Federation, subprogramme "Institutional Development of the Research Sector" of the Russian Federation state programme "Development of Science and Technology" for 2013–2020. Contract No. Z50.31.0045.

Alexandre V. Tchoudinov. Gilbert Romme's account oť the eighteenth-century Russian army. Gilbert Romme's biographers have often studied the time spent in Russia (1779-1786) by this notorious figure of the French Revolution. What they examined was the work of a naturalist who collaborated with practically every outstanding natural science specialist in Russia at the time; they also looked at Romme's experiments in teaching practices as tutor to the young Count Paul Stroganov whom he educated according to Rousseau's theories. However, was spreading the fruits of the Enlightenment the sole purpose of Romme's stay in Russia ? It was recently discovered that he also operated as a secret agent for the French government and gathered intelligence on the Russian military. In this article, we are publishing his memoirs on the state of the Russian army in 1780. These documents are held in the archives of the Saint Petersburg section of the Russian History Institute and in those of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They contain valuable information on every aspect of the Russian military at the time of Catherine II.

The author of this article analyses the history of the complex and contradictory relations of Michel Vovelle (1933–2018), an outstanding French researcher of the Revolution of the eighteenth century, with Russian historians in the Soviet and post-Soviet times. It is noted that, unlike most French left-wing historians from A. Sobul's entourage, cooperation with whom was a priority for Soviet researchers, Vovelle invariably maintained a certain distance in relation to the latter: he did not publish his works in the USSR and did not go there for regular Russian-French colloquiums. The situation changed only when Vovelle, after Sobul's death, became head of the scholarly programme of the Bicentennial of the French Revolution. In this capacity, he made his first visit to the USSR in 1982. However, despite the warmest reception given to him by Soviet historians, he, as his memoirs demonstrate, still tried to keep a certain distance in his relations with them and was not much interested in the real situation in Soviet historical science, limiting himself to reproducing stereotypes common in the foreign press. Even less did Vovelle like his arrival in the USSR in the year of the Bicentennial of the French Revolution, when at a large conference in Moscow held at the height of Perestroika, the ideas of left-wing French historians were sharply criticised not only by their Soviet colleagues but also by the general public. The negative impressions left from that visit to Moscow were apparently so strong that in subsequent years, Vovelle refrained from any active cooperation with historians of post-Soviet Russia. And only a meeting with many of them at the colloquium in Visile (2006) showed Vovelle that, despite ideological and methodological differences with him, his Russian colleagues were infinitely far from the militant anti-communism that dominated in Eastern Europe and that they were open to fruitful cooperation with left-wing historians of France. He was finally convinced of this by a visit to Moscow in the same year, which, unfortunately, turned out to be the last for him.

The history of wars provides abundant material for the study of epidemics since they have often accompanied military conflicts. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of France are especially interesting for researchers due to their duration, the geographical diversity of theaters of military operations, and the large number of participants. The first Russian studies on "Napoleonic epidemiology" published recently show that this era opens wide opportunities to historians in this regard. The author of this article follows in line with such studies, trying to identify the causes and features of the epidemic of dysentery in Bonaparte's troops which occupied Egypt in 1798–1801, and to establish what impact the epidemic had on the course of the expedition. The doctors of the Army of the Orient were initially very afraid of plague, which they had not dealt with before their arrival in Egypt. Dysentery was well known to them, as people often contracted it in France. To combat the disease, they had a set of tools that had been used more or less successfully for decades in Europe. However, in practice, the epidemic of dysentery turned out to be so deadly in the Army of the Orient that in terms of the death toll, it could be compared with plague, if not even surpassed it. According to the author, the reason for such a high lethality of this disease was the fact that in Egypt, it was caused by another, more pathogenic carrier than in France, and the fact that French doctors could designate several intestinal diseases endemic to Egypt and similar to dysentery with a single concept of "dysentery", which they had no experience in combating with. French doctors did not use hygiene measures that could prevent the spread of this disease, because they were guided by erroneous ideas about the etiology of dysentery, considering it a consequence of hypothermia of the body.