Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Underdevelopment and State Policy -- 2 Historical Roots of the 1982 Crisis -- 3 Genesis of Policy Change: From Shared Development to the Petroleum Export Strategy -- 4 PEMEX Expansionism and the Politics of Rapid Petroleum Development -- 5 Defeat of the Petroleum Export Strategy: Intrabureaucratic Conflict and Policy Incoherence -- 6 Debt and Economic Crisis -- 7 State Interests and the Politics of Patronage and Stabilization -- 8 Conclusion -- Appendix -- Bibliography -- Index.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Chapter 1 Inclusive Development: Debates and Issues -- Chapter 2 Inclusive Development and the Burden of History -- Chapter 3 Addressing the Social Deficit in the Wake of Neoliberal Reforms -- Chapter 4 Mexico and Indonesia: Politics and Development Policies in Weak States -- Chapter 5 Chile: Moving toward Greater Inclusion, from Political Polarization to Consensus -- Chapter 6 South Korea: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and the Struggle to Maintain Inclusive Development

Annotation

This article challenges the notion that populist rhetoric in Latin America primarily and consistently arose in response to recent social dislocations and involves, from the onset, a Manichean struggle of the good people against an evil enemy. Instead, this work seeks the origins of polarisation, so often associated with populism, deep in history: in colonial conquest, in highly unequal economic, social and political relations in the post-independence period, and in nation-building myths that denied the existence of exclusions involving race/culture. Through an analysis of speeches given by former president of Argentina Juan Perón and former president of Venezuela Hugo Chávez, the author demonstrates a strong early conciliatory strain in populist rhetoric that calls for the respect and inclusion of racially and culturally distinct lower-class populist followers and acceptance of their importance to the nation. Initially, this rhetoric does not exclude the opposition in the populist leader's concept of the nation. The Manichean aspect of populist rhetoric emerges later, when populist leaders come to believe that their pleas for material and cultural/racial inclusion have been and will always be rejected by anti-populists. In this interpretation, populism is a symptom of long-standing exclusion and latent pre-existing polarisation, not its cause.

"The Washington Consensus in Latin America" published on by Oxford University Press.

Most recent explanations of social welfare and development outcomes have focused on the role and impact of formal institutional arrangements, particularly the state. The institutional legacies of colonial rule and the role of democratic institutions have been common explanatory variables. This article focuses on the historical origins, persistence, and increases in inequality in Mexico and Chile during the twentieth century. It argues that despite important historical economic and political institutional differences, similar processes account for the unequal distributional outcomes that characterize the two cases. Critical conjunctures involved bitter struggle between social groups. While popularly based countermovements (along the lines predicted by Karl Polyani) arose periodically and struggled to improve social conditions, these movements were unable to alter the underlying sources of inequality. By mid-twentieth century, popular pressure had been able to exact only an unequal form of embeddedness (or social protection from the market) that contributed to inequality. Further, waves of popular mobilization linked to critical conjunctures produced reactive historical sequences involving fierce resistance from propertied elites and their middle-class allies. This resistance inevitably gave rise to new conjunctures ushering in new institutional arrangements that entrenched or increased inequality. The absence of a distributive settlement between propertied classes and popular groups was at the heart of the mobilization and countermobilization cycles in both cases; indeed, it was the depth of this disagreement, particularly the disagreement over private property, that fueled reactive sequences and their unequalizing outcomes.

This article examines the role of the middle classes in the divergent distributional outcomes that characterize South Korea and Chile. While equality has been historically low in South Korea, it has been high in Chile throughout the twentieth century, increasing substantially during the period of military rule. The analysis provides a historically grounded explanation of the role of the middle classes in these outcomes, emphasizing processes over time and contextualized comparisons. In Chile, the middle class became sufficiently politically powerful to obtain social improvements for itself, but reacted against popular mobilization and allied with the propertied classes, supporting a military regime that pursued policies that worsened inequality. In South Korea, on the other hand, the middle class, not threatened by intense mobilization from below, played an active role in keeping inequality low through the twentieth century. The timing and thoroughness of land redistribution, the pace of industrialization, and the extent of pressures from the popular classes and of political polarization, all powerfully shaped middle-class distributional politics. Hence, middle-class distributional politics is integral to the power struggles that shape distributional outcomes. Adapted from the source document.